TN USA3 C1869DEC2984J1 01
UPSALA COLLEGE 115
LIBRARY 3D6
EAST ORANGE NJ 07019

The Nation.

August 18-25, 1984 $1.25; U.K. 65p



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS.

MONITORING STERILIZATION

Washington

Because of the large development assistance program in Bangladesh, including a major component for family-planning assistance, both Congress and the U.S. Agency for International Development follow that country's economic and social progress closely. In view of this Congressional oversight, including my own visit in January 1984, I was surprised and distressed to read Betsy Hartmann and Jane Hughes's description of the sterilization program there ["And the Poor Get Sterilized," *The Nation*, June 30].

Even the kicker of the article was misleading. To speak of "Depopulating Bangladesh," a country in which only approximately 15 percent of couples currently use some form of contraceptive, a country which is already the world's most densely populated and for which the most optimistic scenarios suggest the population will double in the next thirty years, is not to describe the demographic reality facing that country.

As the article notes, the Foreign Assistance Act does not [*sic*] prohibit payment of incentives to individuals undergoing sterilization. For that reason, the reimbursements to sterilization acceptors in Bangladesh have been carefully reviewed and monitored. The money a sterilization acceptor receives must cover her transportation costs, her food during her three-day stay at the hospital and frequently must cover as well the costs of someone to bring food to her as well as to care for and feed her family. The payment given makes it possible for a woman to take advantage of the family-planning program, but does not represent a windfall to the woman or her family.

The *Nation* article presents a number of inaccuracies about general conditions in Bangladesh. To name a few:

§ Remarriage for widows is almost unknown in Bangladesh, so whether or not a young widow, who at 17 may already have three children, is sterilized has little bearing on her opportunities for remarriage.

§ Figures for sterilization are higher in the Bangladesh winter, as the article mentions, as this is the time of year agricultural activity is at a minimum. It is a slack time, when people can take time from their labor for any special activities.

§ Health workers are notably unenthusiastic about family-planning work. In clinic after clinic in rural Bangladesh, health workers sit around a large office while a lone family planning worker works in a small room in the back. Some government health workers may not be terribly efficient in carrying out their primary health care responsibilities, but this is far more likely to be because they carry on private practice in addition to their government work, not because they are so involved in promoting family planning, as the article suggests.

I must stress that monitoring of the sterilization program by the United States, the World Bank and other agencies has undoubtedly helped improve procedures and prevent mismanagement. More important, however, is the monitoring by the acceptors themselves. Word of mouth is powerful in the Asian subcontinent, powerful enough to discourage use of the pill because of side effects, and to have brought down a government in India because of forced sterilization. Abuses, medical side effects and deaths such as those reported by authors Hartmann and Hughes would have immediate ramifications, such as a decrease in acceptors, yet each year there has been an increase in the number of sterilization acceptors in Bangladesh.

I and others in Congress remain concerned that U.S.-sponsored family planning programs maintain the highest possible standards of voluntarism and medical effectiveness. We take seriously any criticisms of these programs. But we are also skeptical of accounts that are at variance with our own experience and common sense. *Joel Pritchard*
U.S. Representative

HARTMANN REPLIES

Oxford, England

It is commendable that Congressman Pritchard paid a visit to Bangladesh to look at U.S. development assistance there, but his letter suggests he did not stay long enough to gain a thorough understanding of the A.I.D.-funded sterilization campaign nor of the stark reality facing Bangladesh's poor.

Congressman Pritchard has evidently accepted at face value the dubious distinction between "incentives" and "reimbursements" for sterilization used to justify the payments. We point out that 175 taka is almost one-tenth the average annual per capita income in Bangladesh. Food and transportation costs are likely to absorb only a fraction of that amount, and it is highly unlikely, given the prevalence of large extended families in Bangladesh, that a woman would have to pay someone to care for and feed her family while she was being sterilized. Congressman Pritchard also fails to mention the free sari—worth another 100 taka—the woman receives as "surgical apparel." In the Bangladesh village where I lived for nine months, poor women typically owned only one sari apiece, and several literally dressed in rags.

As for the "inaccuracies" in our article, if Congressman Pritchard had read the first paragraph more carefully, he would have noticed that 17-year-old Hasna was *divorced*, not widowed. However, as anyone familiar with Bangladesh knows, both divorced and widowed women commonly remarry, especially if they are young.

Congressman Pritchard admits that sterilizations increase in the Bangladesh winter when "agricultural activity is at a minimum." He implies that this is because people have more free time for "special activities." But for Bangladesh's poor, free time means hunger, as they depend on a daily wage to eat. To equate desperation with leisure is a cynical twist to the argument.

I agree that some government health workers in Bangladesh are not known for their commitment to delivering basic health care to poor villagers. But paying incentives to bring in sterilization acceptors is hardly conducive to changing their behavior!

Word of mouth is powerful in the Indian subcontinent, but so is the lure of incentives, which have been augmented by the Bangladesh government precisely in order to increase the number of sterilization acceptors. If abuses continue on a large scale, the program may eventually provoke a backlash, discrediting, incidentally, other legitimate family-planning efforts. Whether sterilization abuse could help bring down the government is another matter, however. India had democratic elections at the time; Bangladesh has martial law. To speak out is to risk reprisal. Moreover, it is no accident that the Bangladesh government pushes *female* sterilization, even though it is a riskier operation than male sterilization, since poor women have the least political clout.

Finally, I agree that the kicker "Depopulating Bangladesh," a choice made by *The Nation* without our knowledge, is imperfect. But the country's "demographic reality" is more complex than many population control advocates would have us believe. Although Bangladesh is indeed the most densely populated country on earth, it is also one of the most fertile. Bangladesh has failed to meet the needs of its growing population not because of an inherent lack of resources but because the inequitable distribution of those resources, especially land, prevents their efficient utilization.

These same inequities perpetuate the peasants' need for children, and also deprive poor women who want to practice family planning of access to decent contraceptive services.

There *is* a role for sterilization in Bangladesh, as one option among many in a comprehensive health- and family-planning program which does not rely on force or incentives but instead respects and caters to individual choice. Such a system is unlikely to come about as long as a narrow elite holds political and economic power. But rather than challenging this elite, the U.S. government chooses to bolster it with our tax dollars. Meanwhile, Bangladesh's problems are blamed on overpopulation, for it is easier to tell the poor to limit their numbers than to confront the forces that keep them poor.

Betsy Hartmann

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS.

Volume 239, Number 4

LETTERS
98

EDITORIALS
99 Winter Kills
100 Unsafe Harbor
101 Gerry in the Gap
101 Paul Potter *Marge Grevatt*

COLUMNS
102 Beat the Devil *Alexander Cockburn*
104 Minority Report *Christopher Hitchens*

ARTICLES
105 K.A.L. 007: What the U.S. Knew And When We Knew It *David Pearson*

Drawings by Robert Grossman

Editor, Victor Navasky

Executive Editor, Zachary Sklar; *Associate Editors,* Elsa Dixler, Andrew Kopkind; *Assistant Editor,* Katrina vanden Heuvel; *Literary Editor,* Elizabeth Pochoda; *Assistant Literary Editor,* Maria Margaronis; *Poetry Editor,* Grace Schulman; *Copy Chief,* JoAnn Wypijewski; *Assistant Copy Editors,* Anthony Borden, Judith Long, Art Winslow; *Carey McWilliams Fellow,* Jane Oski; *Interns,* Mary Dolan, Farah Griffin, Steven A. Harvey, Anya Maria Schiffrin, Jackie Stevens. *On leave,* Kai Bird, Richard Lingeman, Katha Pollitt.

Departments: Dance, Mindy Aloff; *Films,* Andrew Kopkind; *Lingo,* Jim Quinn; *Music,* David Hamilton; *Theater,* Paul Berman; *Correspondents: Washington, D.C.,* Christopher Hitchens; *Latin America,* Penny Lernoux; *Europe,* Daniel Singer; *London,* Raymond Williams; *Paris,* Claude Bourdet; *Defense,* Michael T. Klare; *Columnists and Regular Contributors:* Calvin Trillin (*Uncivil Liberties*), Stephen F. Cohen (*Sovieticus*), Kai Bird & Max Holland (*Dispatches*), Alexander Cockburn (*Beat the Devil*), Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers (*The Political Economy*). *Contributing Editors:* Blair Clark, Herman Schwartz, Gore Vidal. *Editorial Board:* James Baldwin, Norman Birnbaum, Richard Falk, Frances FitzGerald, Philip Green, Elinor Langer, Sidney Morgenbesser, Aryeh Neier, Elizabeth Pochoda, Marcus G. Raskin, A.W. Singham, Roger Wilkins, Alan Wolfe.

Manuscripts: All work submitted will be read by the editors. The magazine cannot, however, be responsible for the return of unsolicited manuscripts unless they are accompanied by self-addressed stamped envelopes.

Publisher, Hamilton Fish 3rd

Associate Publisher, David Parker; *Advertising Manager,* Carole Kraemer; *Business Manager,* Ann B. Epstein; *Bookkeeper,* Gertrude Silverston; *Art/Production Manager,* Jane Sharples; *Circulation Manager,* Stephen W. Soule; *Subscription Manager,* Cookee V. Klein; *Classified Advertising Manager,* George Monaco; *Receptionist,* Greta Loell; *Mail Clerk,* John Holtz; *Administrative Secretary,* Shirley Sulat; *Production,* Terry Miller; *Typography,* David Acker, Mark Rausher; *Nation Associates,* Claudine Bacher; *Nation News Service,* Jeff Sorensen.

The Nation (ISSN 0027-8378) is published weekly (except for the first week in January, and biweekly in July and August) by Nation Enterprises and © 1984 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011. Tel.: 212-242-8400. *Subscription Mail Address:* Nation Subscription Service, P.O. Box 1953, Marion, Ohio 43305. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and at additional mailing offices. International Telex: 667 155 NATION.

Regular Subscription Price: One year, $40; two years, $72; six months, $20. Add $7 per year postage Canada, Mexico; $13 per year other foreign. All foreign subscriptions must be paid in equivalent U.S. funds. Claims for missed issues must be made within 60 days (120 days, foreign) of publication date; back issues available $3 prepaid ($4 foreign). **Please allow 6-8 weeks for receipt of your first issue and for all subscription transactions.** Subscription orders, changes of address and all subscription inquiries should be sent to: *The Nation,* Subscription Services, P.O. Box 1953, Marion, Ohio 43305.

EDITORIALS.

Winter Kills

Up in Vermont it snowed every month of 1816, and the locals still call that legendary year "eighteen-hundred-and-froze-to-death." There was no growing season to speak of, livestock starved, farms went under and the isolated rural social structure suffered a severe shock. No Federal Emergency Management Agency trucked in supplies, no office down in Washington offered loans to farmers and no airline promised to fly the frostbitten to tropical resorts. The climatological anomaly 169 years ago was caused by the eruption several months earlier of Mount Tambora, a volcano in what is now the Indonesian archipelago. It spewed such volumes of ash and smoke into the upper atmosphere that the radiance of the sun was diminished across the equator and half a world away, and a volcanic winter descended upon New England.

It's hard to predict how much more powerful than Tambora's belch would be the multiple explosions from a strategic nuclear interchange of, say, 5,000 megatons, with warheads targeted on a list of cities and bases on two continents. But the scientists who have expounded the concept of nuclear winter, in a paper published in the current issue of *Scientific American*, figure that those blasts would so becloud the air that life itself—and specifically the survival of the human species—would be threatened. Nineteen-hundred-and-froze-to-death has become a frightening possibility.

Thirty-nine years after the United States put its nuclear-first-use policy into practice on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the government is still loath to admit that atomic power may have disastrous consequences for the bombers as well as the bombed. Until the five authors of the nuclear winter study began investigating the effects of ash and smoke, no military manual had even mentioned the subject. The Reagan Pentagon had managed to get the nuclear winter report suppressed for a year and a half; according to defense experts, it was scheduled for presentation to a meeting of the American Geophysical Union in December 1982. But since some of the authors had ties with NASA (and may have used the agency's computers to construct their mathematical models), military bureaucrats were able to invoke discipline and keep the work from public scrutiny.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now that it's out, the Pentagon is planning to study the situation, probably as a means to keep from taking it seriously. One scientist told a *New York Times* reporter, William J. Broad, that to test the theory experiments were being devised "up to and including managed forest fires." In other words, we may soon have to worry about Pentagon arsonists burning down most of Idaho in order to figure out whether a bunch of megatons would be bad for the planet. The bureaucratic winter that is likely to fall on the subject may prove fatal before any missile is off the launching pad.

The theory may not be verifiable, and it may even prove wrong in some respects. But as one military analyst said, "It's a pretty good guess." And besides, its promulgation is bound to frighten a few politicians who may still be sitting on the fence as regards the pros and cons of nuclear holocaust. Unfortunately, further study of the phenomenon might make matters worse. If there proves to be a threshhold for the winter—an exchange of only mild megatonnage—the Pentagon might be encouraged to plan for a first strike just below the point of deep freeze. The other side would then be effectively prohibited from retaliating, if it chose not to risk self-destruction. Or, if one side could develop a bomb that did not produce an abundance of smoke, it would then hold an undeterrable weapon.

A no-winter weapon is politically akin to the High Frontier antimissile system that President Reagan is pushing so vigorously. For a lot of technical and economic reasons, the Star Wars scenario may be seriously flawed. It is outrageously, even impossibly expensive [see Thomas H. Karas, "The Star Wars Scenario," *The Nation*, April 9, 1983], and only Reagan's own technocrats believe the system could destroy all incoming missiles before they destroyed, say, Santa Barbara. But in theory, the Star Wars weapons do destroy one important edifice: the structure of nuclear deterrence. If the United States had a system in place that it believed would provide a perfect shield, the great-power political balance would be dangerously shattered.

The Soviet leadership obviously sees that danger and has asked for negotiations to end the outer space arms race before it goes much further. But Reagan has put an impossible condition on negotiations: He will not talk unless he can keep developing his doomsday system. The Russians have nothing to gain—and everything to lose—by agreeing to a disarmament conference in which one side comes loaded for bear, while the bear, in a manner of speaking, is defenseless.

Reagan and the Republican militarists who are riding the High Frontier have no taste for Soviet-American nuclear parity, and thus no interest in disarmament. They are, however, subject to political pressure, and the Democrats have a duty to make peace an issue in the only three months of the next fifty-one when it may do some good. Walter Mondale is not getting terribly far with the budget deficit, his tax increase or the Reagan sleaze factor. This summer seems an appropriate time for him to start talking about things that really matter. By the time winter comes, it may be too late.

Unsafe Harbor

New York City may soon join the ranks of the nation's nuclear bases. With little public discussion and after intense lobbying by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Navy is proceeding with plans to bring a seven-ship Surface Action Group (SAG, in Pentagonese) to Staten Island. As many as 170 Tomahawk cruise missiles will crowd the decks of the vessels led by the battleship Iowa, a World War II relic pulled out of mothballs to be refitted as the lead ship of the group.

When the Navy announced its plans, most New York officials seemed thrilled by the militarization of the harbor. Senator Alfonse D'Amato, the local anchor of Reaganism, estimated that New York City would gain 9,000 jobs and $500 million annually from the project. Mayor Edward Koch was pleased to have the hardware coming to his home base, and neither Gov. Mario Cuomo nor Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan—Democrats who on occasion criticize the Reagan Administration defense postures—made any fuss about the plan.

Less complaisant politicians might find a lot to worry about as the flotilla approaches. First of all, there's a significant risk of nuclear accident. Each year, the U.S. Coast Guard responds to hundreds of accidents in New York harbor's waters. For its part, the Pentagon admits to having more than thirty nuclear weapons incidents since 1950. And as Charles Perrow points out in his book *Normal Accidents*, high-technology systems contain the possibility of combinations of errors that make accidents inevitable "no matter how effective conventional safety devices are."

City Council member Miriam Friedlander, one of the few New York politicians opposing the SAG, has introduced a council resolution forbidding the introduction of nuclear-armed ships into the harbor. The grass-roots Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Harbor has mounted demonstrations, including a "die-in" at the Port Authority bus terminal last spring. In addition, a petition drive will be conducted in September by the Peace Network, and civil disobedience actions protesting the Navy's plans are being considered for the weekend of September 22.

Besides the safety issue, there are serious questions about the economic benefits claimed for the project. Rear Adm. Eugene Carroll Jr., retired, of the Center for Defense Information says that D'Amato's predictions are inflated. C.D.I. says that the civilian jobs the SAG will provide will number in the hundreds, not the 3,000 predicted by the Navy.

Finally, there is a basic concern that the nuclearization of New York harbor will have a more damaging effect on civic society than it will on potential national enemies. The metropolis is undergoing a creeping militarization. The Intrepid, a World War II aircraft carrier tied up at a West Side berth where passenger liners used to dock, is now a major museum and tourist attraction [see James Munves, "The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

War Museum," *The Nation*, September 3-10, 1983]. A satellite tracking station, which could be used for military as well as commercial purposes, is planned for one of the city's last open areas, also on Staten Island.

The Administration says the SAG is part of its campaign to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union and thus guarantee the peace. (The force can also be used to intervene in the Caribbean and the Persian Gulf.) But it is more likely that its presence in New York will heighten international tensions and make war more thinkable.

Gerry in the Gap

The nomination of Geraldine Ferraro as the Democrats' Vice-Presidential candidate has an importance that transcends symbolic politics or cynical gesture, even if it contains those elements as well.

Many women, including those on the left, are moved by Ferraro's selection. They know what it meant for a woman from an Italian Catholic family to put herself through law school in the 1950s by teaching second grade. And as Angela Davis put it, "Gerry Ferraro is not the first female Vice-Presidential candidate. But hopefully she will be the first one elected." But the feminist content of Ferraro's candidacy is more than a matter of identification and pride. Because Antonetta Ferraro, a garment worker, struggled as a single parent to support her children, Geraldine Ferraro has fought for legislation to achieve economic equity for women throughout her terms in Congress. She was the main sponsor in the House of the Retirement Equity Act recently passed by the Senate. Last year she voted for the Congressional Black Caucus budget.

The Democrats' choice of Ferraro recognizes years of organizing by Democratic women leaders and feminist groups. It also recognized the potential women's vote. Women have been badly hurt by the Reagan Administration's policies, from poor women denied public assistance to office workers in the public sector whose jobs have been eliminated. In order to win, the Democrats will have to capture the "gender gap" vote—the women who oppose the Administration on foreign policy, military spending, arms control and women's rights. They will also have to appeal to women for whom the gender gap has more to do with economics than with ideology. Whether poor women and black women will respond to Ferraro's presence on the ticket remains to be seen.

In the first weeks of the campaign, Ferraro has participated in the Democrats' celebration of family and flag, and as Mondale's running mate she stands on the conservative platform she helped shape. But Antonetta Ferraro's daughter is not an American Margaret Thatcher or a female Tip O'Neill. Her prominent role in a Mondale Administration would secure more attention for the feminist agenda—not just the mightily assaulted freedom of choice but equal pay, funding for day-care centers, paid maternity leaves, restoration of cuts in public assistance and a renewed Justice Department attack on sexual discrimination in employment and other areas. Fritz Mondale may wind up with more than he bargained for.

Paul Potter

Paul Potter, who died of cancer last month at age 45, was one of the handful of young Americans who created the New Left of the 1960s. As president of Students for a Democratic Society in 1965, Potter organized the first national demonstration against the war in Vietnam. A completely unexpected crowd of 16,000 trooped to the Washington Monument on that clear spring afternoon, and Potter spoke to them. "Name the system," he said. Analyze, understand—and change—the society that sends Americans to fight peasants in Asia, that countenances racism and inequality at home and that excludes ordinary people from participating in decisions that affect their lives.

A powerful, exhilarating, contradictory and unmanageable movement developed from the conscience and commitment of the S.D.S. and civil rights activism of those years. Potter spent much of the 1960s with a community organizing project in a poor white section of Cleveland. Later he taught in Boston, wrote a book while living in an old farmhouse in New Hampshire and helped plan the demonstration at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the protests after the trial of the Chicago Seven.

Like so many of the generation he helped mold, Potter never joined the mainstream. Several years ago he moved to New Mexico, living simply, raising turkeys for a while and working to provide social services for the disadvantaged. He had no use for the Big Chill ethos. "In the eighties," he said, "people who know better are busily, helplessly . . . decorating the cages they already live and work in." He continued to organize. His last effort was in some ways the hardest: In December 1983 he launched, while maintaining his own clearly stated commitment to nonviolence, a nationwide support group for Kathy Boudin, with whom he had worked in Cleveland's S.D.S. almost two decades earlier.

Paul Potter not only theorized about the movement; he seemed to embody it. In his life were intertwined all the themes of moral passion and political reason that often energized and sometimes paralyzed action. A friend once said that he "lived in a world not yet born, yet he was firmly entangled in this one."

Dream and reality dogged him to the end. When his disease was diagnosed in April, he embarked on a hectic course of traditional and alternative treatments. He summoned his friends and comrades to New Mexico, thanked everyone and died outdoors, in sight of the mountains. As one friend put it, "He was a man wanting to garden in a boulder field."

MARGE GREVATT

Marge Grevatt is director of the Cleveland-based Center for Cooperative Action.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BEAT THE DEVIL.

The Worst Treason

If democracy is to derive from the consent of the governed, then it follows that this consent must repose on knowledge. There can be no more appropriate occasion than an issue of *The Nation* devoted to the K.A.L. Flight 007 affair to stress that this essential knowledge of the governed is something governments strive ceaselessly to constrict and extinguish.

Those who wish to study a case in which individual gallantry in the service of democratic knowledge was rewarded by journalistic pusillanimity, self-righteousness and the basest cowardice should study the case of *The Guardian*—the leading liberal daily in Great Britain—and Sarah Tisdall. The story is told with incisive eloquence by David Caute in the twelfth issue of the literary periodical *Granta*, published this week.

In the fall of 1983, amid tremendous public uproar, Britain's Conservative government was secretly preparing to accept delivery of the first batch of 160 cruise missiles from the United States. That October 20, Minister of Defense Michael Heseltine wrote two memoranda to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, copies of which were distributed to six senior ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe. The first memo discussed tactics of political and media damage-control to be employed when the missiles arrived, and the second concerned security arrangements at Greenham Common, one of the U.S. Air Force bases to which the cruise missiles were committed.



The following day Sarah Tisdall, a 23-year-old civil service clerk working in the office of Sir Geoffrey Howe, read the memos. Perceiving the sharp contrast between the government's public obfuscations about the delivery of the cruise missiles and the simple facts related in the memos, she decided, as she said later, "I couldn't stomach it. I felt the public had a right to know what was being done to them."

She photocopied the documents, scored out the government markings on them with a felt-tipped pen, put them in a brown envelope and left it at *The Guardian*'s office, addressed to the paper's political editor. About 250,000 demonstrators were due in London the next day for a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament rally and *The Guardian* lost no time. After some checks by a defense correspondent had suggested the memos were genuine, an 800-word story based on them appeared in the paper the following day.

The Guardian did not publish the first memo in its entirety until October 31. It never published the second or even acknowledged its existence for five months. This memo dealt with the possibility that demonstrators at Greenham Common might be shot by Royal Air Force personnel, backed by armed U.S. guards. *The Guardian* did, however, clearly draw upon this memo in its stories.

Thus far *The Guardian* had lived up to its journalistic responsibility to disclose instantly to the public important information withheld by a government intent on deluding its electorate and avoiding public embarrassment. Inseparable from this function was the duty of the paper to protect its informant. And here the paper and its editor, Peter Preston, failed in the most abject fashion.

The British government naturally exerted itself at once to recover the memos and identify the culprit. *The Guardian*'s editor should have lost no time in doing something very simple: He should have burned the memos. Having already committed the offense of publishing classified documents which the government could claim breached national security, *The Guardian* would not seriously have compounded its affront had Preston put a match to them. A November 11 letter from the government requesting return of its property had no legal force; until a writ was issued there could be no question of contempt of court.

But instead of destroying the memos Preston asked his lawyers what he should do. Being lawyers, they advised him that it would be "an offense" to destroy them. Preston therefore asked the government whether he might erase markings on the memos that could identify the informant. Then he would return them! The government, as Caute says, "no doubt astounded by the vulnerability of the other party," refused and issued a writ on November 27.

The Guardian's defense against the writ rested solely on the claim that the markings on the memos might reveal the identity of the informant. But this was entirely beside the point. It was the paper on which the memos were photocopied that permitted the government to trace the copying machine and close in on the copier.

As Caute observes, "The only viable defence in a case such as this is a political defence: on behalf of the Fourth Estate the *Guardian* should have committed itself to the protection of its source whatever the cost, arguing not only that it owed a debt of honour to the individual, but also an obligation to resist those strategies of the state—like Heseltine's—which are designed to deceive the electorate or keep it in ignorance." This approach would have required a sympathetic lawyer. *The Guardian* chose Lord Rawlinson, a former Conservative Attorney General who, one may assume, believed in the right to leak classified documents about as much as Archbishop John J. O'Connor of New York believes in a woman's right to have an abortion. And in court Rawlinson duly denounced the informant's "betrayal of trust" in leaking material to *The Guardian*.

The Guardian's editor was by then badly scared and looking for any excuse to betray the confidence of honor. Among the rationales he and his colleagues did not scorn to proffer was the innuendo that the informant might somehow have been acting not out of "altruism" but as . . . what? A spy? A profiteer? *The Guardian* never explained.

On December 16, the court ruled that *The Guardian* had to hand over the published memo. Caute infers that the government never knew for certain whether *The Guardian* had the second memo (about security arrangements) and carefully concludes that "the truth about the second document had been conveyed through lawyers representing the *Guard-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ALEXANDER COCKBURN

ian to lawyers representing the government." Some journalists at *The Guardian* suggested to Caute that this revelation was intended as an act of plea bargaining by the paper—an attempt to prove its patriotism and avoid possible criminal prosecution.

As often happens when a vile deed has been done, the perpetrators rummaged wildly through the excuse pile. They claimed that if *The Guardian* failed to return the memos it would be bankrupted by heavy fines. In fact, it is rich and could easily afford a fine even as high as a half-million dollars. *The Guardian* had also been attacking striking newspaper printers for abusing laws against secondary picketing and argued that its calls for adherence to the letter of the law must apply equally to itself. Finally, *The Guardian* gratefully accepted the rationale proffered by *The Times* of London, that it had no moral obligation to protect an anonymous informant.

On December 16, the day of the court ruling, *The Guardian* returned the first document to the government. On January 6 Tisdall was questioned, and three days later she confessed. She was sentenced to six months in prison on March 23.

After this disgusting performance Preston extruded the traditional smokescreen. "It has been a horrible blow," he told his staff, "but the paper goes on and, I hope and believe, in a way that shows it can't be squashed or intimidated." At its annual conference this year, the National Union of Journalists (though not the paper's own N.U.J. chapel) condemned Preston. The union's president, Eddie Barrett, had said earlier, "The fact is that the *Guardian* editor has shat on a principle we hold dear, and shat on an informant."

Caute's savage narration should be in every journalistic anthology. He is entirely correct in concluding that "the government lives within ourselves. . . . We are all, in our weak moment, Peter Preston. . . . The breaking of an oath of secrecy (like Sarah Tisdall's) touches a sensitive spot; we may admire her at a distance but would we employ her? There is certainly a sexual fear in our high regard for taciturnity and our suspicion of the wagging tongue."

On April 16 an appeal by Tisdall was rejected. The fact that she had leaked the second memo much facilitated that rejection. *The Guardian* was not prosecuted, in all likelihood because it had plea bargained with this document and was thus "spared the public humiliation of betraying Miss Tisdall yet again, in public, and under the cool, disgusted gaze of the young woman in the dock."

Kowtowing to Reagan

The TV networks are kowtowing to the Reagan Administration in the most craven fashion, none more zestfully than ABC, whose Riefenstahlian coverage of the Olympics—interspersed with heavy-breathing promos for its movie *Call to Glory*—finally provoked protest. These Olympics frighteningly evoked the rising tide of American chauvinism and self-regard. It was not in 1936 in Berlin that the camera caught a ferociously partisan local crowd attempting to intimidate the umpires in the gymnastics competition with cries of "Ten! Ten!" as the local heroine—Mary Lou Retton—strutted, preened and courted the baying mob.

Leigh Montville in *The Boston Globe* (in the summertime columnists tend to start quoting *The Globe* and discovering the merits of Trollope) had a fine column from Los Angeles about the late-night bus from the press center to the hotels winding its way through the inner city: "I look at the bums on Pico, standing in the doorways. I look at the iron gates on Crenshaw, every store locked and covered, made into a fortress to withstand attack in the night. I know the ride will take almost an hour and the landscape will not change."

Montville tried to imagine what it would be like if he were a foreign journalist covering the games:

> I would be looking to see my native son or daughter go to work. All I can see is American flags. Everywhere. On shirts. On hats. On banners. On the flagpoles. . . . It would be as if my player, my team, my country did not exist . . . this time they are America's games. No one else seems to matter. The pleasant, spontaneous cheering of 1980 in Lake Placid for the US hockey team has become a manufactured mania for 1984. Every crowd exults for every American.

The Dark Forces

Connoisseurs of the agitprop of John Vinocur, Paris bureau chief of *The New York Times*, are still savoring his great coup earlier this year, which got his name in the German newspapers when he dredged up André Glucksmann, French New Right *philosophe* and apostle of nuclear deterrence, to state the hitherto unobserved connection between the German antinuclear movement and anti-Semitism. It was Glucksmann's considered view, according to Vinocur, that "there is no little merit in the idea that anti-Americanism [read: the German peace movement] now has the contours of classic anti-Semitism—power unseen; dark, violent forces beyond all control."

More of this in a future column; but we should note here that when Vinocur gleefully reported the Paris turnout for Bastille Day as "sparse" (thereby reflecting the low fortunes of the left), he failed to mention the awful weather prevailing on that day.

Mopping Up

Due to circumstances beyond my control—the date was changed without my knowledge—a recent column said that Charlene Mitchel ran under the C.P.U.S.A. banner for President in 1972. The correct date was 1968.

Nor was I shown a letter from Michael Harrington, published in the previous *Nation*, deploring "*Schadenfreude*" on the left, by which he seemed to be alluding to criticism by me and subsequently by me and Andrew Kopkind of his discussion with Irving Howe printed in June in *The New York Times Magazine*. I scarcely think it is *Schadenfreude* to attack self-described socialists for chicken-spirited waffling on many of the most important issues of the time, from Israel's conduct to rising U.S. protectionism to the candidacy of Jackson, not mentioned by Harrington or Howe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MINORITY REPORT.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS

Cyprus

August should be the perfect month for the Washington columnist. The city closes down, the President takes yet another ill-earned holiday, a pleasant torpor falls between party conventions. Your intrepid correspondent lays aside his scourge and packs a leisure bag. What could be better, after the tepid and mediocre Democratic convention in San Francisco, than a vacation in the scorching Mediterranean? I arrive with a jaunty air and begin to muse among the cool, shaded courtyards and the litter of wineskins. The gemlike little churches, the pencil-thin spires of the mosques, the inspiring air of the Levant. . . . One could rhapsodize indefinitely. But what do I find, almost before I have unpacked? The Reagan Administration is sleepless. It has got here before me, and begun to scatter serpents about my Eden.

A few hundred yards from where I sit, there is a hideous barricade of oil drums and barbed wire. It is a line of partition, imposed on the island by the Turkish Army ten years ago this summer. Every Cypriot knows that Henry Kissinger colluded first with the Greek military junta and later with the Turkish Army in order to bring this partition about. But in the intervening years, the United States had been taking some steps to make amends. Aid money was supplied for the 200,000 refugees who lost their homes in the invasion. At the United Nations, the American delegation generally voted against the Turkish occupation. But in the last few months, there has been a significant turn for the worse.

If you cross the heavily guarded line of demarcation (journalists can but Cypriots cannot), and if you push on for another twenty-five miles or so, you will come to a little village called Lefkoniko. All its original inhabitants were driven out by the Turks, but it is still a village of great charm and tranquillity. Lately, though, it has become more and more difficult to visit Lefkoniko. In fact, the Turkish occupation authorities have more or less declared it off-limits to visiting correspondents. More, the days have been made hideous by the noise of earthmovers and heavy transport. Foreign construction workers have been imported in large numbers. Huge quantities of construction material have been seen being unloaded at the nearby port of Famagusta (which has also been forcibly denuded of its rightful inhabitants).

As the dust settles in Lefkoniko, the outline of an airport estimated to cost $500 million can be seen emerging. And quiet Americans have been noticed hanging about the new runways. Let us play a brief game of elimination: The cost of this airport is more than the national budget of the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot state, which is in reality a mere shadow thrown by the Turkish Army. So it cannot be under that state's control. There is embarrassed talk in Turkish circles about the need for a new tourists' airport. But I can testify from experience that the existing airport in the occupied north is running at less than half-capacity. It is not recognized as an international airport and will not be as long as Greece and Cyprus have any say in the matter. The only airline that lands there is a Turkish one, and those planes are seldom full. There is no need whatever for a new civilian airport in northern Cyprus.

What then? Lefkoniko Airport, on the best available evidence, is being readied for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. The Reagan Administration has been searching for a site for an R.D.F. airstrip in the region for more than a year. Most recently, it was turned down by the government of Jordan. Even Turkey, which allows its territory to be littered with NATO air bases, doesn't want the R.D.F. on its soil because it wishes for and needs to maintain good relations with the Arab world.

Turkish-occupied Cyprus would offer an ingenious way out of this impasse. The mainland Turkish dictatorship could argue before the world that the Lefkoniko base was not its responsibility. Last November, it proclaimed its colony in Cyprus to be an "independent" state [see editorial, "Turkey's Big Bite," *The Nation*, November 26, 1983]. The move seemed inexplicable. Why should the Turks risk another wave of revulsion at their Cyprus policy? Why should they tear up the treaty under whose terms they originally intervened to preserve the "unity and territorial integrity" of the island? It is now becoming clearer why they did so. A deniable client state with no real voice of its own would be the perfect host for an R.D.F. installation.

A few other things are becoming clearer also. The United States, in a departure from custom, abstained on the U.N. vote unanimously condemning Turkey for recognizing its new Cyprian clone. A new deal has just been announced, whereby the U.S. Defense Department will help to modernize Turkish land forces free of charge. And the American Ambassador to Cyprus, Raymond Ewing, has been recalled. Of all the United States' envoys sent here since Roger Davis was killed during the chaos of 1974, Ewing had been the most sympathetic and the most popular. His replacement, Richard Boehm, is a hard-liner whose previous post was in Ankara and who testified at his confirmation hearings that American aid to Turkey should not be linked to progress on the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has sent its Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Aristov, to Nicosia as an indication of its concern. After ten years, the Cyprus issue is heating up again.

The use of American aid money to build an unnecessary airport on stolen territory, administered by an occupation that is internationally condemned, makes pitiful nonsense of the State Department's claims to be neutral in Cyprus. It explodes the pieties about peaceful reunification to which the United States has put its name. In a way, it is fitting that the United States should be trying to deploy its forces in a furtive manner on illegally confiscated land. But what a way for taxpayers to be celebrating the tenth anniversary of a shameful aggression. Meanwhile, every magazine in the United States deplores Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's alleged sympathy for "international terrorism." When you next read one of those inspired pieces, spare a thought for Lefkoniko.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARTICLES.

K.A.L. 007

What the U.S. Knew And When We Knew It

David Pearson is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Yale University. He got interested in the U.S. role in the K.A.L. Flight 007 episode almost by accident. Pearson's doctoral dissertation has to do with the Defense Department's little-known World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS, or Wimex), whose business it is to provide the National Command Authorities (the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff et al.) with timely information and worldwide intelligence on a day-to-day basis. Trying to track down a rumor that the Wimex computers were not functioning on the day K.A.L. 007 went down, Pearson found nothing in the press; so he spent a year buried in the technical literature, which led him to the story that appears below. It is appropriate that a scholar whose areas of concentration are complex organizations and communication, rather than a member of the traditional press (which was quick to accept the Administration's version of what happened), should be the one to break this extraordinary story. Repelled by what our President denounced as "a horrifying act of violence" and focused on the question of whether the Soviets knew that K.A.L. 007 was a passenger plane, the press neglected to ask some elementary questions about our own role in the tragic event. In his essay, Pearson does not pretend to answer the question of whether K.A.L. 007 was a spy plane, but he does answer two key questions—What did we know and when did we know it? By implication he raises further profoundly disturbing questions about just how open our society is when it comes to matters of alleged national security. Indeed, when it comes to matters Soviet, can we ever trust our leaders to tell us the truth? —*The Editors*

DAVID PEARSON

On the last day of August 1983 Korean Air Lines Flight 007, a 747-200B Superjet commercial airliner, was shot down by a Soviet SU-15 fighter over Sakhalin Island in the eastern Soviet Union. All 269 people aboard died as the aircraft plunged more than 30,000 feet into the frigid waters of the Sea of Japan.

The world reacted to the news with horror. The U.S. government took the high ground, suggesting that the airliner had accidentally strayed into Soviet territory unbeknown to U.S. agencies and had been shot down without warning. In that view, which prevailed in the U.S. press and the minds of most citizens, responsibility rested squarely with the Russians and could be attributed to their indifference to human life. "I speak for all Americans and for the people everywhere who cherish civilized values in protesting the Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian passenger plane," President Reagan said on September 1. "Words can scarcely express our revulsion at this horrifying act of violence."

Soviet accounts, on the other hand, were at first vague and riddled with inconsistencies. Six days passed before the Russians even admitted that one of their pilots had shot down the aircraft. Nine days after the downing, the Russians clearly articulated the position they have maintained since: the airliner was on an intelligence mission for the United States; thus the U.S. government was to blame for the tragedy.

Whether or not the airliner was on a spy mission and what the nature of such a mission might have been are difficult questions to answer definitively, largely because the Reagan Administration has remained silent on so many crucial issues. But one year after the downing of K.A.L. 007, a careful and thorough analysis of new, complex and technical evidence now in the public record leads to the inescapable conclusion that official U.S. accounts of the incident are neither complete nor credible. While there is no doubt that the Soviet Union's act of downing an unarmed civilian airliner was the proximate cause of the loss of 269 lives, the U.S. government also must be held accountable and accept its share of the blame. The United States' responsibility can now be demonstrated on the basis of the following virtual certainties:

§ Various U.S. military and intelligence agencies, including the Air Force, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, had to have known that Flight 007 was off course well prior to the attack over Sakhalin.

§ Those agencies had to have known that K.A.L. 007 was heading toward Soviet territory while a major Soviet missile test was in the making there, and that the airliner was thus in grave danger.

§ The agencies had the time and means to communicate with K.A.L. 007 and correct its course, but not one of them did so.

§ It seems probable that Soviet radar systems were jammed at least on Kamchatka Peninsula and perhaps on Sakhalin Island.

§ Finally, given the capability of U.S. intelligence and communications systems, it can be presumed that the White House and the Secretary of Defense also knew of the events as they transpired, well in advance of the shootdown. They had plenty of time to issue instructions to civilian air-traffic control authorities to correct the jetliner's course, but did not do so.

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Charles Perrow and John Keppel. *This article © copyright 1984 The Nation Associates;* The Nation *magazine.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The implications are profoundly disturbing. The most charitable interpretation is that U.S. military and intelligence agencies suffered an extraordinary series of human and technical failures which allowed the airliner to proceed on its deviant course. If that was the case, it would mean that the most serious failure in the history of the U.S. early warning and communications, command, control and intelligence (C^3I) systems occurred that night. However, a much more likely and frightening possibility is that a conscious policy decision was made by the U.S. government—at what level it is not clear—to risk the lives of 269 innocent people on the assumptions that an extraordinary opportunity for gleaning intelligence information should not be missed and that the Soviets would not dare shoot down a civilian airliner.

A Predictable Event

While the loss of 269 lives in this way is shocking and unprecedented, the downing of K.A.L. 007 was not an isolated event. Since 1950 the Soviet Union and its allies have shot or forced down numerous U.S. aircraft intruding into their airspace. By far the most famous incident was the downing over the Soviet Union of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers in May 1960, on the eve of a summit conference between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Also in 1960, on the night of July 1, a U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft packed with long-range cameras, mapping cameras and electronic equipment for checking sites and frequencies of aircraft detection systems was attacked by two Soviet MIG-17 fighters over the Barents Sea; two crew members were lost. That same month, a DC-3 Dakota aircraft en route from Copenhagen to Hamburg, West Germany, entered East German territory over the Baltic coast and was forced to land by MIG fighters which used internationally established interception signals, including the firing of warning bursts along the intruder's path.

On January 28, 1964, while the United States and Soviet Union were actively involved in seventeen-nation disarmament talks in Geneva, a U.S. Air Force T-39 jet trainer ventured at least sixty miles into East German airspace; all its crew members were lost when it was shot down by a Soviet MIG fighter. Just six weeks later, on March 10, a twin-engine Douglas RB-66 reconnaissance aircraft attached to the 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron based at Toul-Rosières, France, entered East German airspace and was shot down by MIG interceptors. U.S. ground stations had given it instructions to reverse course, the Air Force said, but the RB-66 did not respond. As in the T-39 incident, the government said the intrusion resulted from failures in navigational equipment.

On June 30, 1968, a Seaboard World Airlines DC-8 flying toward South Vietnam from Seattle in the company of two other C.I.A. aircraft "apparently strayed 80 to 100 miles off course," in the Pentagon's words, and entered Soviet airspace over the Kuril Islands, north of Japan. It was intercepted by Soviet MIG-17 fighters, which used internationally accepted procedures to force down the airliner on Etorofu Island. The Pentagon said the intrusion was caused by navigational difficulties.

Until the K.A.L. 007 incident, the most publicized Soviet downing of a civilian airliner was that of Korean Air Lines Flight 902, on April 20, 1978. Carrying 110 people from Paris to Seoul, it flew more than 1,000 miles off course over sensitive Soviet military installations for two hours. The pilot apparently defied the orders of Soviet interceptors and took what a State Department spokesman described in *The New York Times* as "evasive" action. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, acknowledged that the Russians had opened fire only when other means had failed. The shots, apparently fired over Karelia, near the city of Murmansk, sheared off a fifteen-foot section of the right wing and forced the airliner to crash-land ninety minutes later on a frozen lake near the town of Kem. Although two people died and others were injured, the only explanations ever offered for the airliner's deviation from course were equipment failure and navigational difficulties. As with the earlier incidents, the downing of K.A.L. 902 happened at a sensitive moment: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was in Moscow discussing arms control issues with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

These incidents and numerous others suggest that the United States and its allies have been engaged in ongoing and extensive aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and

JOURNALISTS' AND EDITORS' BRIEFING
Subject: What Next In the U.S.S.R.?

Monday, September 24, 1984 • 10 A.M.-9:30 P.M.
Harvard Faculty Club
20 Quincy St., Cambridge, MA 02138

Important background information for journalists and editors on economic, political, social, military and journalistic conditions in the Soviet Union. Includes a session on "The Experience of Covering the News in Moscow and Reporting It on the Outside." The conference will feature former Moscow correspondents David Shipler and Marvin Kalb, and Samuel Rachlin, reporter for Danish television in Moscow. Also includes an evening session on "News Coverage of the Soviet Union From the Perspective of a Former Soviet Citizen."

Full cost, including lunch, dinner, beverages: $150. For speakers' schedule and reservations, contact Marshall I. Goldman, acting director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138. Tel. (617) 495-4485.

Sponsored by The Russian Research Center, Nieman Foundation for Journalists, U.S. State Department and the William and Mary Greve Foundation.

FOOTNOTE ON AN HISTORIC CASE: IN RE ALGER HISS

This just-published booklet by author William A. Reuben identifies 114 factual errors in the Federal District Court of New York's 1982 decision upholding Hiss's conviction for perjury in 1950. This flawed decision, upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1933, stands as the last legal word on one of the most celebrated cases in modern history. 1 copy $5, 10 copies $40, 50 copies $150, 100 copies $250. Make checks payable to The Nation Institute and send to "Hiss," The Nation Institute, 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other Communist nations for decades. The United States, reluctant to admit that, has usually cited radio or navigational difficulties as the cause of intrusions into Soviet airspace, even when the aircraft took evasive action. Perhaps most troubling, many of the incidents have occurred at potentially constructive moments in the process of arms control negotiations between the superpowers. In all instances that can be documented from the public record, the Russians have attempted to force intruding aircraft to land, firing on them only if they did not respond to signals. In fact, so rigid are Soviet interception procedures that their interceptors are derisively referred to by U.S. Air Force pilots as "guided missiles."

Time magazine has suggested that Soviet priorities are different from those of the United States: the Russians place highest priority not on human lives but on preventing penetration of their airspace. If the Russians seem paranoid, however, it must be conceded that their fear is not without basis. Duncan Campbell has charged in the *New Statesman* that since 1950 at least twenty-seven U.S. aircraft have been forced or shot down and sixty others attacked while on electronic or photographic reconnaissance missions, with at least 139 servicemen losing their lives in the process. And that does not include the ones that got away. These charges have never been satisfactorily answered. Based on that record, if the Soviet Union seems obsessed with maintaining the integrity of its borders, the United States seems equally obsessed with their violation. *Time*'s assessment, perhaps, needs to be reversed: the United States, at least in its intelligence-gathering activities, places a very high priority on penetrating Soviet airspace, sometimes at the expense of human life. That is the context in which the tragedy of Flight 007 must be understood.

Leaving Alaska

From the beginning, K.A.L. 007 was not a normal flight. The jetliner departed Anchorage at 1300 Greenwich mean time (G.M.T.), forty minutes behind schedule, a delay which has never been adequately explained. According to data contained in the International Civil Aviation Organization's final report on the incident, K.A.L. 007's pilot added 9,800 pounds of fuel at Anchorage which were neither needed for his scheduled flight nor accounted for in his subsequent position reports to air-traffic controllers. (The I.C.A.O. report made no mention of this inconsistency.)

Precisely when K.A.L. 007 left its cleared flight path is not certain. The Anchorage Visual Omni Range (VOR) directional beacon, by which pilots can find their direction and location, was out of service from August 31 until September 2. About ten miles west of Anchorage, K.A.L. 007 began to diverge from a direct course to Bethel, Alaska, and was six miles to the north of its normal route at the limit of civilian air-traffic control. The Anchorage controllers said they did not consider this important because they assumed the airliner would correct its course when it picked up the VOR radio beacon at Bethel, several hundred miles to the west. But fifty minutes after takeoff, when the airliner reported it was passing Bethel, the Air Force's radar at King Salmon, Alaska, showed it was already some twelve nautical miles north of its scheduled course. (See map below.) Although the airliner's instruments should have conclusively indicated the deviation, the pilot of K.A.L. 007 falsely reported to air-traffic control that his airliner had passed Bethel on course.

One explanation of the deviation has been that the pilot set an initial heading for Seoul while the airliner was still in Anchorage, and thus the aircraft began flying a Great Circle (direct) route to Seoul, instead of its scheduled course. But that does not bear scrutiny, since the Great Circle route would have taken the airliner some fifty nautical miles north of Bethel, rather than the twelve King Salmon recorded. If, however, K.A.L. 007 had begun to fly a Great Circle route just after it passed beyond the range of civilian radar, it would have passed north of Bethel at the distance observed. So it seems K.A.L. 007 did not deviate significantly off course until it was out of the range of civilian air-traffic control radar.

By about 1420 G.M.T., when the jetliner, presumably continuing on a Great Circle route, approached the limit of the military radar at Cape Newenham, Alaska, it was at least sixty-five nautical miles off course. That is, within the area of military radar coverage from mainland Alaska, K.A.L. 007 had already exceeded by at least twenty-five times the maximum permissible error of two nautical miles per hour for its Inertial Navigation System (I.N.S.). (The Federal Aviation Administration reports that the average drift on more than 500,000 actual flights using the I.N.S. has been about one nautical mile per hour.)

It is all but certain that military personnel spotted Flight 007's deviation. Military air-traffic radar along the route, according to one experienced United Airlines pilot, has a range of well over 250 nautical miles, and it has the ability to see over the horizon. In testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Donald C. Latham, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence, was ques-

R-20, Route Korean Air Lines Flight 007 Was Cleared to Follow



SOURCE: Eugene Kozicharow, "FAA Studies Upgraded Pacific Navaids," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, September 19, 1983, pp. 18-21; see p. 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tioned about the use of over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar in the area of the North Pacific route taken by the Korean airliner. "I don't know what over-the-horizon radar they're talking about," he said. "No such radar exists in the Far East."

But Latham's statement is incomplete and misleading. While it is true that there are no U.S. OTH-B radar systems in operation in the Far East, some conventional radars in that area have been given an over-the-horizon capability through a classified process of "bending" the radar signals. It extends coverage beyond line-of-sight constraints, giving a range greater than 300 nautical miles. Although this was certainly relevant information for the Congressional committee investigating the shootdown of K.A.L. 007, the way the question was posed allowed Latham to sidestep discussion of the actual capabilities of the U.S. military in Alaska and the Far East. Indeed, *The New York Times* reported former intelligence officials as saying that the American military has over-the-horizon radar and radio navigational ability that can track aircraft in their flights most places around the world, including the Far East. (See map below.)

F.A.A. administrator J. Lynn Helms confirmed that communications links between military radar stations and civilian air-traffic control could have been used to report a straying aircraft like K.A.L. 007. And they should have been, according to an agreement the F.A.A. and the Defense Department reached in 1982. Under the agreement, Alaska-based military radar with extended range is supposed to verify that airliners are on course when they begin the long flights west from Alaska. If they deviate, military radar operators are to notify the F.A.A., which in turn radios the airliner. Federal Aviation Administration sources told *The Washington Post* that this extends coverage to about 200 miles off the Alaskan coast.

According to the I.C.A.O. report, the King Salmon data went to Anchorage air-traffic control but were "not presented to controllers." Similarly, the military station at Cape Newenham apparently did not notify civilian air-traffic controllers that Flight 007 had deviated substantially from its course. The reasons for that silence have never been made clear.

U.S. Military and Civilian Radar Coverage for R-20 (Through Checkpoint NEEVA)



SOURCES: Richard Witkin, "FAA Chief Says Jet Was Beyond Radar," *The New York Times*, September 19, 1983, p. A7. Douglas B. Feaver, "KAL Jet's Path Strewn With Lawsuits and New Tracking Policies," *The Washington Post*, December 31, 1983, p. A6.

The Role of K.A.L. 015

As K.A.L. 007 flew to the south and west, it deviated ever farther from its R-20 route, known as Red 20, which is composed of a series of checkpoints, most spaced at intervals of about 280 nautical miles. When the airliner passed north of Bethel, its pilot had reported to air-traffic control that it would arrive at NABIE, the first required overwater checkpoint on its route, at about 1430. A pilot is required to notify air-traffic controllers if he is going to be more than three minutes late to his next checkpoint—something K.A.L. 007's pilot did not do. Further, if a pilot exceeds his scheduled flight speed, he is required to report that change to air-traffic control. According to an experienced pilot's analysis of the data in the I.C.A.O. report, K.A.L. 007's pilot must have exceeded his scheduled speed several times during the flight, but failed to report these changes.

According to transcripts of transmissions released by the F.A.A. to the House Committee on Science and Technology, between 1432 and 1434 Anchorage air-traffic control tried four times on VHF to communicate with the airliner but was unsuccessful. During the same period Anchorage recorded a series of communications from an "unknown source" which did not identify itself by flight number, as is customary. The transmissions, spoken in Korean, went as follows:

1433:47 (unintelligible)
1434:18 Well wait a minute call again please
1434:50 Three three zero I can't wait a minute
1434:54 Three three zero okay I got it hello

Reading the transcript, it is clear that the "unknown source" is actually a conversation between unknown sources. The message at 1434:18 was from K.A.L. 007, according to the "best interpretation" of the F.A.A. Who was the other party? Most likely it was Korean Air Lines Flight 015, which at 1435, immediately after the unknown transmissions were recorded, forwarded a report from K.A.L. 007 giving its position as checkpoint NABIE and reporting its altitude to be 31,000 feet. Since Flight 015 was relaying reports for Flight 007, the two airliners must have been in communication. Yet it is strange, if the other party was Flight 015, that it did not also mention in the report it forwarded for Flight 007 that 007 wanted to increase its altitude to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books that make things happen.

Readers International announces a remarkable series in contemporary world literature. Each hardcover volume, by subscription, is just $7.95 *(Retail prices average $13.35).*


A Cadre School Life: Six Chapters
by YANG JIANG
Ri Readers International
"Readers International is the most original and plausible publishing venture I've heard of." – Ariel Dorfman, author of Widows and The Empire's Old Clothes.
I DREAMT THE SNOW WAS BURNING SKÁRMETA
A RIDE ON THE WHIRLWIND SEPAMLA
MY MERRY MORNINGS KLÍMA
NAJRAN BELOW ZERO YAKHLUF
TO BURY OUR FATHERS RAMÍREZ

IT IS 1970, in China's Henan Province, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. There the elderly woman scholar Yang Jiang spends two years laboring in the barren world of a cadre school for political "reeducation."

Out of a national ordeal that changed the lives of twenty million Chinese intellectuals, Yang Jiang has created a timeless and beautiful meditation. For the first time, the Cultural Revolution is brought close to us in the West, just as we experienced the Gulag in the simple, personal prose of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.

Go next to Soweto: The children of South Africa's shanty towns struggle in revolt. The noted black poet Sipho Sepamla is first to cast these events in a novel. An instant bestseller in 1981 in South Africa, the government moved swiftly to stop further editions. Now *A Ride on the Whirlwind* returns to print, here and in South Africa.

Closer to home, Nicaragua in the Somoza era is dramatically recreated in *To Bury Our Fathers*. This is the panoramic novel by Sergio Ramírez, Nicaragua's leading prose writer, regarded in Latin America as a literary peer of Garcia Márquez and Cortázar. Here is his finest imaginative work.

These are worlds we cannot hope to see except through literature. And now such groundbreaking books are available at last in outstanding English translations commissioned for Readers International's non-profit publishing program.

Every other month you receive a new volume in the series. Each is a sewn, hardcover edition, yours at the series price of $7.95 plus $1.00 for postage. (Retail prices range from $10.00 to $15.00.) If at any time you wish to cancel, simply notify RI in writing.

How does RI select the books? Instrumental in these decisions is our Advisory Board – translators, editors, and writers from around the world, including Dennis Brutus, Eduardo Galeano, Nawal al Saadawi, Edward Said, and Josef Skvorecky. And the books are further distinguished in several ways:

Each was initially banned or censored at home: RI is particularly committed to conserving literature in danger.

Each is current – from the past 10 years.

And each book is new to readers here – although many have been acclaimed in European editions.

Your subscription assures you of a powerfully good read every two months. It also assures some of the world's most gifted, original writers the means of being heard in today's most powerful international language, English. Please return the coupon right away to receive your first book.

Your subscription begins with *A Cadre School Life: Six Chapters* by Yang Jiang. It is a lucid, moving account of the Cultural Revolution. The *Times Literary Supplement* called it "an outstanding book, quite unlike anything from 20th century China...superbly translated."

It will be followed, every other month, by a new volume. Each is priced for you at **$7.95**. (Retail prices in parentheses.)

South Africa: *A Ride on the Whirlwind* by Sipho Sepamla ($12.50).

Nicaragua: *To Bury our Fathers* by Sergio Ramírez ($15.00).

Czechoslovakia: *My Merry Mornings* by Ivan Klíma ($15.00).

Palestine: *Najran Below Zero* by Yahya Yakhluf ($12.50).

Chile: *I Dreamt the Snow Was Burning* by Antonio Skármeta ($15.00).

Ri READERS INTERNATIONAL
Subscriber Service Department, PO Drawer E, Columbia, LA 71418

Please begin my subscription to RI's new series, beginning with *A Cadre School Life: Six Chapters*. Every other month I receive a new book – each at the $7.95 subscriber price, plus $1.00 for postage. At any time I may cancel my subscription simply by writing to you.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ ZIP _____

☐ My check for $8.95 payable to Readers International is enclosed.

Bill my ☐ Mastercard or ☐ VISA for $8.95

Account # _____

Expiration Date _____ Signature _____

☐ I wish to charge each volume, as I receive them, to my credit card number above.

A SPECIAL SAVINGS: I want to save money, and save RI the cost of billing me, by paying $36.00 for a charter subscription for all six volumes. ☐ I enclose my check for $42.00, including postage. ☐ Bill my credit card number above.

X

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

33,000 feet. About nine minutes later, at 1444, K.A.L. 007 itself radioed Anchorage International Flight Service Station directly to request a change in altitude to 33,000 feet. If the other party was Flight 015, which was on R-20 about six to eight minutes behind the location it falsely reported for Flight 007, then that airliner could have been playing a supporting role in the events that were to follow.

The Route of the U.S. Reconnaissance Plane

As K.A.L. 007 approached Soviet airspace, it passed close to a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. Although President Reagan seemed to deny any connection between the two aircraft, a close examination of official accounts of the incident and maps of the area reveals that the RC-135 was likely much closer to K.A.L. 007 than U.S. explanations implied, and that the two aircraft may actually have flown in close proximity to each other for several minutes.* Moreover, it is certain that the RC-135 had identified the airliner and knew where it was and where it was heading prior to K.A.L. 007's first of two intrusions into Soviet territory.

What is known about the route of the RC-135 that night? On September 4, the White House issued a statement that read, in part:

> The closest point of approach [of K.A.L. 007 and the RC-135] was approximately 75 nautical miles, while the U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit. Later the U.S. aircraft crossed the path taken by the Korean airliner, but by then the airliner was almost 300 miles away. Still later, as the Korean airliner strayed off course and overflew Kamchatka Peninsula, it was initially identified by the Soviets as an RC-135 and then as an unidentified aircraft. Approximately 2½ hours after the U.S. and Korean aircraft were near each other in international space, the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner as it was exiting or after it had exited their territory west of Sakhalin Island, some 1,000 miles from the operating area of the U.S. aircraft.

U.S. officials said that the American aircraft flew no closer than fifty miles to the Soviet coastline.

The Russians presented their account on September 9 when Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces; Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee; and Georgy Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister, held an extraordinary press conference before a packed audience in the Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow. Behind them was a huge map of the Soviet Far East, dotted with American reconnaissance aircraft which the Russians say were in the area prior to the downing of K.A.L. 007. (*Pravda* reported that in the five-hour period before the airliner's first intrusion, Soviet air defense had tracked seven RC-135s on missions off the coast of the Soviet Far East; Pentagon spokesman Lieut. Col. Peter Friend emphatically denied that there had been seven but declined to say how many there were.)

According to the Russians, the RC-135 that came closest to K.A.L. 007 had been operating in the area for about two hours before their air defense radar spotted the airliner, at 1551 G.M.T. At 1600, they say, the two aircraft rendezvoused and flew side by side at the same speed for about ten minutes, both at altitudes of 26,000 feet, so that their radar images merged. Then one aircraft flew north toward Alaska, according to the Soviet account, while the other altered its course slightly and flew toward strategic military areas near Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka Peninsula. The RC-135 played a control role, the Soviets claimed, and the Defense Ministry newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, later reported that the RC-135 also dived below the radar coverage off Kamchatka, acting as a decoy to distract air-defense crews so that the Korean jetliner could enter Soviet airspace undetected.

As different as the U.S. and Soviet accounts seem, there are no direct contradictions between them. The first point to examine is the U.S. contention that the closest approach of the two planes was seventy-five nautical miles, "while the U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit." The obvious suggestion is that this was the closest approach of the two aircraft. That is the line F.A.A. administrator Helms carried to the International Civil Aviation Organization council meeting in Montreal on September 15. On the basis of the White House statement, he said, it was "absurd to suggest that the RC-135 was there to monitor the K.A.L. flight or that the planes flew together for ten minutes." Notice, however, the qualifying clause in the White House statement: "while the U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit."

The National Security Agency assigns RC-135 aircraft "orbit" areas near target nations. The orbit is a flight path that resembles a figure eight and is designed so that the electronic intelligence intercept platform is never turned directly toward the target nation's airspace or land mass. Standard operating procedures call for the RC-135 to make a number of elliptical orbits, each about 100 nautical miles long. These loops are referred to as the mission orbit, which can be seen on the map on page 111. The upper loop on the diagram represents the RC-135's mission orbit, and the chronology presented brings the aircraft to within seventy-five nautical miles of Flight 007 while in that orbit. However, U.S. official reports neglected to mention that the reconnaissance aircraft could have passed quite close to K.A.L. 007 while it was *outside* its mission orbit. Thus, the middle loop on the map, part of the Soviet explanation of events, could have been followed without contradicting the U.S. account. That loop, not part of the mission orbit of the RC-135, may have been an anomaly undertaken to bring the aircraft into closer proximity to K.A.L. 007. Asked to comment on that possibility, a Defense Department spokesman, Comdr. Fred Leeder, said, "As a matter of policy we don't discuss reconnaissance missions."

The second contention to be examined is that when the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft again crossed the path of K.A.L. 007, the jetliner was almost 300 miles away. The Soviet version fits that explanation perfectly. However, because the U.S. government has provided almost no infor-

* Existing U.S. radar and other electronic data from ground-based stations and the RC-135 could settle this issue, but the government has refused to make the relevant information available.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mation about the course of the RC-135, it is necessary to turn to other sources.

Many of the flight paths reported for the RC-135 in the mainstream press put its mission orbit south of the Commander Islands, which lie 100 miles off the east coast of Kamchatka and belong to the Soviet Union. But such a path, which assumes a convergence of the two aircraft south of the Commanders, is not possible given the known facts. The average cruising speed of Flight 007 was slightly over 550 miles per hour, and both U.S. and Soviet accounts acknowledge that the plane was shot down approximately two and a half hours after the RC-135 and K.A.L. 007 were nearest each other in international airspace. Traveling at that speed, where would the airliner have been two and a half hours before it was shot down? Tracing back, it must have been considerably to the north and east of the Commander Islands, rather than to the south and west. Indeed, the official U.S. account noted that at first K.A.L. 007 and the RC-135 were in the same area, that later the RC-135 crossed the path of K.A.L. 007 and that still later K.A.L. 007 overflew Kamchatka. To have crossed the path of K.A.L. 007, the RC-135 must have previously been to the west of the airliner's route. There is only one place where those events could have occurred at that time, in that sequence: north of the Commander Islands. Why would the United States consider that information sensitive? Because the time during which the two aircraft were in closest proximity was about a half-hour before K.A.L. 007 first entered Soviet airspace—plenty of time to warn the jetliner, call ground stations or notify higher authorities.

There is additional evidence to support this reconstruction of the RC-135's route. U.S. officials have acknowledged that the RC-135 was indeed off the northeast coast of Kamchatka Peninsula at the time K.A.L. 007 approached Soviet territory, but this fact came out indirectly in a *Washington Post* article and received little attention in the U.S. press.* In addition, while numerous reports, including those in *The New York Times*, *Aviation Week*, *Time* and *Newsweek*, put the Commander Islands precisely on K.A.L. 007's flight path, they cannot be accurate, since in both Soviet and U.S. accounts the jetliner did not actually penetrate Soviet airspace until it was over Kamchatka. To have avoided entering Soviet airspace over the Commander Islands, the airliner must have been either substantially to the north or to the south of the island group. Had it passed to the south, it would have been approximately on course and it would have avoided Kamchatka entirely. So K.A.L. 007 must have passed to the north and penetrated Soviet airspace almost exactly where the Soviets claimed—another fact that seems to have escaped public attention.

The statements of U.S. officials regarding the area where the RC-135 and K.A.L. 007 were closest to each other were apparently intended to suggest that there was no association between the two aircraft. On September 5 President Reagan announced that the RC-135 had been back at its base in Alaska for an hour when the Korean airliner was downed, implying that the two aircraft were far apart in both space and time. But that is not borne out by retracing the flight paths of the two aircraft. K.A.L. 007's known speed and rate of deviation from course suggest that it first entered Soviet airspace at 1630 G.M.T., as the Soviets claimed. (The United States has not commented on this.) The RC-135, meanwhile, had to have flown to the north and east, continuing to monitor communications and radar activity on Kamchatka as it returned to its base on Shemya Island in the Aleutians, less than 400 miles away—not on the Alaskan mainland as the President implied, which would have been a much longer trip. The map below shows that the RC-135 could quite easily have been on the ground for about an hour prior to the attack on K.A.L. 007 over Sakhalin, as President Reagan claimed (the shootdown occurred at 1826 G.M.T.), and still have been in close proximity to K.A.L. 007 and well within the range of its electronic equipment when the jetliner first entered Soviet airspace over Kamchatka.

Finally, a retracing of the flight paths shows that the Korean airliner must have altered its course in the vicinity of the RC-135, as the Russians charged. After the rendezvous with the RC-135, K.A.L. 007 flew essentially parallel to Red 20, rather than continuing to deviate from course as it had done earlier. If a change had not been made, K.A.L. 007,

Reconstruction of Flight Routes for K.A.L. 007 and U.S.A.F. RC-135



SOURCE: David Pearson

* At the Soviet press conference in Moscow on September 9, Soviet Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov displayed a large map showing the overlapping flight paths of the RC-135 and K.A.L. 007 in precisely this location. In most pictures of the conference presented in the U.S. press, no locations for the routes of the RC-135 and K.A.L. 007 could be ascertained, for the part of the map showing the coast of Kamchatka Peninsula could not be seen—a curious omission. However, there were some pictures in which the Commander Islands were clearly visible to the south of the area of convergence of the two aircraft.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alexander Cockburn on the PRESS.
Andrew Kopkind on the CULTURE WARS.
Stephen F. Cohen on the SOVIET UNION.
Mindy Aloff on DANCE.
Christopher Hitchens on WASHINGTON.
Bird and Holland on GLOBAL POLITICS.
Calvin Trillin on UNCIVIL LIBERTIES.

The voices of dissent speak out in THE NATION.

The Reagan Administration is not funny; what it's doing to the country, and the world, is very serious. The voices of dissent must speak out. And the best place to hear them is in *The Nation*.

The Nation has been questioning the abuses of power for 119 years. And there has never been a greater need for it than now. *The Nation* conducts its own investigations, reports the kind of news Jeane Kirkpatrick and Jerry Falwell don't release through the national wire services, and serves as the forum for the leading voices of dissent on the critical issues of our time.

If you think these voices are important, join your voice to theirs and subscribe to *The Nation*. There's a reduced introductory rate for you. And as a gift for friends, too.

Add your voice to ours.

Special Introductory Rate for New Subscribers.

THE NATION
BOX 1953, MARION, OH 43305

YES!!! Send me 24 issues of *The Nation* for $15, a savings of 50 percent off the newsstand price. I understand that I may cancel at any time and receive a refund for all unmailed copies.

☐ Double my savings. Send a full year for $28.
☐ My payment is enclosed—reward me with FOUR FREE ADDITIONAL ISSUES!
☐ Please bill me later.

NAME (PLEASE PRINT)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

D8429

SEND THE NATION TO A FRIEND!
(And save $3.)

Please send 24 issues of *The Nation* to the following people at the special gift rate of just $15 for the first and $12 for each additional gift. And send a card announcing the subscription(s).

GIFT TO

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

☐ Enclosed is $____ for ____ subscription(s).
(Extend each subscription FOUR FREE ISSUES.)
☐ Bill me later.

Add: Canada and Mexico; $3.50/24 issues, $7/one year; Other Foreign: $6.50/24 issues, $13/one year. Subscriptions payable in equivalent U.S. funds.

D8429

given its rate of deviation, would eventually have flown over central Sakhalin Island rather than the island's southern tip, where it was shot down. That the airliner must have changed course seriously undermines both the claim that the RC-135 played no control role in the overflight and the suggestion that somehow the pilot of the jetliner accidentally left the flight controls on a continuous heading. Thus, the propositions that the RC-135 and K.A.L. 007 somehow passed each other like ships in the night and that the reconnaissance aircraft noticed nothing unusual in the area do not appear credible.

What the RC-135 Knew

It is certain that the RC-135 was aware of both the location and flight direction of K.A.L. 007 which, at the time the two aircraft passed at their closest point, had deviated from its normal route by over 200 statute miles. To understand just how certain it is, one must know something about the capabilities of the RC-135. A modified version of the Boeing 707, it normally carries a Strategic Air Command flight crew and a large staff of technicians and translators, all under the operational authority of the National Security Agency. The RC-135, able to stay aloft for missions of eighteen to twenty hours with only a single midair refueling, is equipped with cameras, electronic jamming equipment, high-resolution side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) for all-weather reconnaissance, and other electronic equipment for surveillance and reconnaissance. Recent technical developments have also made possible real-time transmission of high-resolution television and SLAR imagery to ground stations day or night, as well as automatic pattern recognition for detecting changes in SLAR imagery between successive flyovers. Some RC-135s have even more specialized electronic equipment which can collect performance data that Soviet missiles transmit by radio to ground stations while in flight.

The RC-135 would have "painted" or registered with radar the Korean jetliner as a matter of routine aerial safety, according to military officers quoted in *The New York Times*. The crew of the RC-135 also would have ascertained the position and course of K.A.L. 007 and reported the data to ground stations, especially if they could not identify the other aircraft or be certain of its intentions. So as to be alerted to potential threats, the RC-135 carries an electronic surveillance system that automatically acquires and identifies signals from both ground-based and airborne radar. Crew members receive a warning of possible danger both visually and aurally, and a scanner insures immediate recognition of all possible threats. It is hardly believable that this extremely sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft operating close to the Soviet Union would let an unidentified (and possibly hostile) aircraft pass between its area of operations and its home base.

It is also safe to assume that the reconnaissance aircraft was tuned in to the conversations between Soviet ground stations and the pilots of the four SU-15 and MIG-23 fighters that were sent to intercept K.A.L. 007 over Kamchatka; that is its job. The RC-135 had to be monitoring the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increased Soviet electronic activity in the area as the Korean airliner first approached and then entered Soviet airspace, and had to be beaming the intercepts to a number of ground stations in real time (i.e. as the action was taking place). If all systems were operating as they should have, the crew could have notified Shemya and other military stations about Flight 007's deviation from course. Those stations in turn could have contacted civilian air-traffic controllers in Japan. The RC-135 also could have communicated directly with the airliner had it received an instruction from military controllers to do so, since it can transmit messages over an extremely broad range of radio frequencies, including those used by civilian and military aircraft, ships, ground stations and air-traffic controllers. It is not known whether the RC-135 did that. In any event, K.A.L. 007 was not put back on course.

The Role of the RC-135

What was a reconnaissance aircraft doing in such close proximity to an intruder in Soviet airspace? Clarence Robinson in *Aviation Week & Space Technology* explained that RC-135s routinely operate off Kamchatka Peninsula "to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements, and this one was there to calibrate its radars on a milk run."

But there are other possibilities. One is that the RC-135, whether or not it was a control and decoy as the Soviets claim, was there to collect whatever intelligence about Soviet defenses that K.A.L. 007's intrusion yielded. An important mission of the RC-135 is to document the "electronic order of battle" of the Soviet defenders by collecting and analyzing electronic signals. Some of its gear picks up radio signals from Soviet ground installations and aircraft, tipping the United States to any Soviet alert in the area. Other receivers and antennas are tuned to pick up radio transmissions between Soviet air-defense installations and interceptor aircraft. Other RC-135 jobs, according to *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, are to locate all radar systems in an area of interest, to identify their roles and characteristics and to indicate ranges within which aircraft flying at different altitudes would come under surveillance by those systems. With this information, U.S. bombers and missiles would be better able to evade Soviet air defenses on the way to their targets in the event of war.

In *The Puzzle Palace*, a recent book about the National Security Agency, James Bamford noted that for many years the N.S.A. has been "ferreting" the Soviet borders with aircraft jampacked with the latest in electronic and communications eavesdropping equipment. But only radar that is activated can be picked up, and some of the most important radar is activated only by apparent border penetration. For that reason, Bamford wrote, pilots occasionally engage in the dangerous game of "fox and hounds," flying directly toward the border, setting off the radar and pulling away at the last minute. Once in a while pilots actually penetrate Soviet airspace, intentionally or unintentionally. Two former U.S. Air Force communications intelligence specialists who flew RC-135 missions from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa have confirmed this. "It has been our experience that, on occasion, N.S.A. adjusts the orbits of RC-135s so that they will intentionally penetrate the airspace of a target nation," wrote T. Edward Eskelson and Tom Bernard in *The Denver Post*. "This is ordered to bring a target country's air-defense systems into alert so that the N.S.A. can analyze the fully activated systems for potential flaws." An intrusion into the airspace of the Soviet Union, therefore, if it triggers Soviet air-defense systems, offers an intelligence bonanza. It is certainly possible that the RC-135 was there to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity afforded by K.A.L. 007's intrusion.

Such an explanation is completely consistent with the fact that both U.S. and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft are notorious provokers and, occasionally, outright violators of one another's airspace, and that the high-technology "tickling" of enemy air defenses is routine. During the first eight months of 1983 alone, Moscow claimed, the United States had violated its airspace over the Kuril Islands, north of Japan, nine times. U.S. officials replied that throughout those months they had heard the Russians complain about only one such violation—hardly a denial of the Soviet charge.

For their part, Soviet commercial aircraft frequently fly off course in the United States and pass over sensitive military installations. The most publicized incident occurred on November 8, 1981, when an Aeroflot airliner en route from Moscow to Washington's Dulles International Airport went off course and flew over the Trident nuclear submarine base at Groton, Connecticut, and the Strategic Air Command facility at Pease Air Force Base near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Several days later the same airliner, returning from Washington to Moscow, flew a similar unauthorized route, and the United States filed a formal protest with the Russians. U.S. Air Force sources note that about seventy



DRAWINGS BY ROBERT GROSSMAN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

times each year big Soviet TU-95 "Bear" reconnaissance aircraft veer inside the Air Force's Aerospace Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), a buffer area surrounding U.S. airspace which ranges from 60 to 200 miles wide. The Russians have acknowledged that in the first eight months of 1983 U.S. fighters intercepted Soviet reconnaissance aircraft seventy-seven times in the ADIZ. *The Christian Science Monitor* quoted British Air Comdr. Norman McEwen as saying that the United States intercepts more than 300 Soviet aircraft each year in the American ADIZ. "Both sides do this," he said. "It's one way of probing each other's air defenses. By intercepting, you show you're on your toes."

But there is another, even more intriguing explanation for the RC-135's presence in the area. U.S. intelligence had detected preparations for a major Soviet missile test that was to take place on the night of August 31 in the highly sensitive part of Kamchatka for which K.A.L. 007 was heading. The missile to be tested was the new SS-X-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which Moscow says is only an updated model of the older solid-fuel SS-13 permitted by the SALT II agreement. However, the United States has com-

The Great Communicator Incommunicado?

When did the United States' highest-ranking civilian and military leaders—the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—first learn of K.A.L. 007's intrusion into Soviet airspace and its downing approximately two and a half hours later? The government has provided very little information on that question. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, said on September 1 that the State Department was alerted that the airliner was off course between 10 and 10:30 P.M. (Eastern daylight time) on Wednesday, August 31. "Within the hour," Burt said, "there were indications that much more tragic circumstances had taken place."

According to White House spokesman Larry Speakes, the State Department did not notify President Reagan of the intrusion until 10:30 P.M. E.D.T. Three hours later, at 1:30 A.M., national security adviser William Clark gave Reagan additional details and, "as a result of all the double-checking," Speakes said, Reagan was not informed that K.A.L. 007 had been shot down until 10:10 A.M. E.D.T. the following day, September 1.

Since the shootdown occurred at approximately 2:30 P.M. E.D.T. on August 31, it would appear that neither State nor the President knew anything about this major international crisis until approximately eight hours after it was over, and that the President didn't know fully what had happened until twenty hours after the fact. That mysterious time gap in which information was evidently unavailable raises serious questions about whether U.S. communications systems were functioning properly that night.

The National Command Authorities—the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—are supposed to receive early warning of enemy attacks and other intelligence information through the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS, called "Wimex"), which they also use to direct the armed forces. But its history shows that Wimex is not very reliable. It has failed during a number of critical situations—including the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in 1967, the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo in 1968 and the North Korean downing of an EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in 1969. In each of those incidents, the House Committee on Armed Services concluded, "those parties with a need to know were deprived of that knowledge because of a lack of responsiveness on the part of the Department of Defense communications system." As a result of those and other embarrassments, Wimex was reorganized in 1971; but problems have continued to plague the early warning system. Transmissions were delayed, misrouted and lost during the secret governmentwide mobilization exercise Nifty Nugget in 1978. Wimex also had major problems during the Defense Department's war games Prime Target in 1977 and Proud Prophet in the summer of 1983. Worse still, the revamped system has failed to provide timely information to leaders during real crises, such as when Representative Leo Ryan and three reporters were killed in Jonestown, Guyana, in 1978.

Since the State Department's Office of External Research uses Wimex to monitor all information coming into the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, State's apparent lack of knowledge of the K.A.L. 007 incident until eight hours after the shootdown suggests that on the night of August 31 something may have gone wrong with the system. Given Wimex's poor track record, it is certainly possible that one or more of its antiquated Honeywell 6000-series central computers might have been down, as they frequently are. That would have left the State Department in the dark and could account for the reporting gap. The Administration refused to comment on the possibility of such a communications failure during the K.A.L. 007 incident.

Nor has the Administration offered any more information on when the White House and Defense Department learned of the events involving K.A.L. 007. Are we, then, to assume that the President and Secretary of Defense knew nothing until eight hours after the shootdown? Not at all. Unlike the State Department, the White House and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plained that the SS-X-25 seems to violate a treaty provision that forbids the development of a new single-warhead missile in which the warhead weighs less than 50 percent of the warhead dispenser, or "bus." That configuration was set in order to deter either side from dodging the treaty's restrictions by adding warheads to the bus later. The United States also suspects that the combination of the changes in throw-weight and the missile dimension has exceeded the 5 percent increase permitted under SALT II. Since the Russians do not permit inspection of their facilities, the United States must assess the capabilities of the missile indirectly, using satellites, reconnaissance aircraft and ground-based intelligence platforms. The United States can thus be expected to attend very closely to any Soviet testing.

In fact, RC-135s routinely observe the final stages of test flights of Soviet ICBMs off the coast of Kamchatka and collect telemetry data transmitted to ground stations by the missiles. Defense officials have acknowledged that the RC-135 in question on the night of August 31 was part of a reconnaissance program known as the Cobra Dane Space-track Radar System and was patrolling off the coast of Kamchatka because U.S. intelligence expected the Soviet missile test. When the Korean jumbo jet flew into the area, preparations for the missile test were promptly shut down, and according to American officials quoted in *The Washington Post*, the RC-135 returned to its base. On September 8, White House spokesman Larry Speakes alluded briefly to reports that the Soviets had been preparing a missile test during the period before the airliner was downed. "I've seen those press reports," he said, "which I don't doubt." He declined to elaborate, saying that details might compromise intelligence capabilities.

Whether the RC-135 was in the area because of the SS-X-25 test or because it was coordinated with K.A.L. 007's intrusion into Soviet airspace, it must have observed the Korean airliner and had ample time to take steps to correct its course, but it did not do so.

The Role of U.S. Agencies

The unfolding drama of an unidentified aircraft violating Soviet airspace must have been observed as it happened not only by the RC-135 but by U.S. military and intelligence services at a number of stations in the Far East. The most valuable information was probably collected by an elaborate



Defense Department are informed of important events not only through Wimex but also through the National Security Agency's Digital Network/Defense Special Security Communications System (DIN/DSSCS).

Intercepted electronic and intelligence signals from Soviet units on Kamchatka, Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Islands and the Soviet mainland are usually transmitted by N.S.A. stations via satellite through the agency's Special Intelligence Communications channel to N.S.A. headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. But in the event of problems or especially important occurrences, messages are designated CRITIC, i.e. suitable to be transmitted directly to the White House and Defense Department over the Critical Intelligence Communications System (CRITICOM), one of several channels that plug into the N.S.A.'s DIN/DSSCS. A superadvanced, ultrasecure communications system, CRITICOM permits nearly instantaneous reporting of tactical intelligence from anywhere on the globe. The N.S.A.'s goal is to have CRITIC messages on the President's desk within ten minutes and, according to the House Committee on Armed Services, they have on average been transmitted there within four to six minutes.

There is no question that the extraordinary seriousness of the penetration of Soviet airspace over Kamchatka by a foreign commercial jetliner, at precisely the time and place of a test of a secret new Soviet missile, would have merited a CRITIC message. This means that within minutes of K.A.L. 007's first intrusion and possibly even earlier, the N.S.A. should have been sending ongoing intelligence information to the White House and Defense Department. Thus both the President and Defense Secretary should have known of the events at least two hours before the jetliner was shot down over Sakhalin Island—that is, at least ten hours before the State Department was reported to have first informed the President.

If the White House and Defense Department did not know of the events involving K.A.L. 007 as they were happening, there seem to be only two explanations: either the most serious failure in the history of the U.S. communications, command, control and intelligence and early warning systems occurred on the night of August 31, 1983, or the intrusion was deliberate and no CRITIC message was sent. —D.P.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

listening post on Shemya Island, at the western tip of the Aleutians. The giant Cobra Dane phased-array radar at Shemya, which can simultaneously monitor the position, motion and nature of more than 200 objects, has been described by James Canan in his book *War in Space* as so powerful it can spot a baseball at a range of 2,000 miles out in space. Processed data on targets being tracked by Cobra Dane are transmitted immediately via satellite to the Space Defense Center at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) buried beneath the granite of Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, to the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and to N.S.A. headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.

Cobra Dane's primary mission is to monitor Soviet missile testing in the Far East. Normally, the radar operates over a broad range in what is called its "search mode." But during a Soviet missile test or if a particularly interesting radar image is observed, it operates in the narrower "tracking mode," which yields much more detailed information about the sizes and shapes of the target objects. As indicated by the map below, the two places where K.A.L. 007 intruded into Soviet airspace—Kamchatka Peninsula, only 450 miles from Cobra Dane's Shemya Island base, and Sakhalin Island, only 1,400 miles from Shemya—are well within Cobra Dane's exceptional range. And a radar blip in an unexpected position is precisely the kind of unusual event that Cobra Dane is designed to detect.

Complementing Cobra Dane is the U.S.S. Observation Island, a ship used for monitoring missile testing and electronic signals. Its radar, Cobra Judy, can collect information that line-of-sight constraints block from Cobra Dane's electronic eyes. The Navy has not disclosed the precise location of the Observation Island on the night of August 31, but a Navy spokesman said the ship was operating in the North Pacific.

With their extraordinary capabilities, Cobra Dane and Cobra Judy would have been actively monitoring K.A.L. 007 for practically the entire length of its flight. It should also be recalled that the RC-135 was transmitting to the same station on Shemya Island. For Cobra Dane and Cobra Judy—and the operators who monitor them in real time—not to have detected an anomaly such as K.A.L. 007's flight deviation would have been a scandal and a failure of a high order.

Also watching that night were a number of highly sophisticated U.S. stations in Japan, including the U.S. Air Force's 6920th Electronic Security Group located at Misawa Air Base near the northern tip of Honshu. Misawa, described by *Pacific Command* as the largest signal intelligence station outside the continental United States, collects information from the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kuril Islands, the Soviet Far East and Siberia. The 6920th also operates a station at Wakkanai, on the northernmost tip of Hokkaido, which stares unblinkingly at Sakhalin Island. The Army Security Agency has two listening posts on Hokkaido and one at Sakata, on Honshu, which is directed 550 miles across the Sea of Japan toward the intriguing geographic confluence of China, Korea and the Soviet Union. Still another Army station is at Kakata, on the southern island of Kyushu. In addition, the Naval Security Group, the Navy's intelligence arm, maintains listening posts at Kamiseya, near Yokohama, and at Hanza, Sobe and Futema, on Okinawa. And the N.S.A. has a headquarters at Camp Fuchinobe, a heavily protected 592-acre site a dozen miles west of Tokyo.

The Japanese operate their own large radar station at Wakkanai, as well as twenty-seven other radar sites around Japan. In testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Capt. William Frisbie, Pan American's chief pilot in the Pacific region, noted that the Japanese have the ability to provide radar coverage at their end of Red 20 to about 300 miles from the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido. Thus, Japanese radar, which is linked to the U.S. system, should have been tracking K.A.L. 007, and U.S. military and intelligence services should have had access to the information the Japanese radar picked up. Moreover, like its U.S. counterpart, the Japanese military is supposed to inform civil air-traffic controllers of any deviations it may observe in commercial flights.*

In Korea, the U.S. National Security Agency has a small base at Toegeuag and stations in Seoul, P'Yong T'Aek and the Red Cloud compound, twelve miles from Uijonabu. To monitor Soviet missile tests, the United States also maintains a new top-secret installation located in a remote mountainous region of Xinjiang Ulghur Autonomous Region in western China, near the Soviet border.

All those stations operate twenty-four hours a day, every day of the year. Said one Pentagon officer, "Nothing flies from, over or near Sakhalin that we don't monitor." This statement could be extended to include the Bering Sea, Kamchatka Peninsula and the Sea of Okhotsk.

Evidence suggests that the C.I.A. was also monitoring the

Area of Coverage: Cobra Dane Phased-Array Radar



SOURCE: Philip J. Klass, "USAF Tracking Radar Details Disclosed," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, October 25, 1976, pp. 41-46.

* In the 1968 incident involving the Seaboard World Airlines DC-8, Japanese military controllers radioed a warning to the DC-8 the moment it veered toward Soviet territory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flight of K.A.L. 007 that night. Less than seven hours after the incident Korean Foreign Ministry officials announced (incorrectly) that K.A.L. 007 had been forced down on Sakhalin Island; they cited the C.I.A. as their source.* The C.I.A. report came several hours before the Japanese Defense Agency gave U.S. officials transcripts of communications between the Soviet pilots and ground stations, so the C.I.A. must not have relied on Japanese information. Later that same night, Dale Peterson, a spokesman for the C.I.A., said the agency could neither "confirm nor deny" reports that the South Korean airliner had landed on Sakhalin Island.

While all those agencies were monitoring the flight in real time, a number of U.S. satellites were collecting intelligence which the President must be presumed to have had when he presented the U.S. version of the incident to the world. Among those were secret and extraordinarily expensive "ferret" satellites which gather radar signals, microwave communications and telemetry transmissions (called SIGINT) round the clock in the Soviet Far East. Ferrets come in a variety of types. Rhyolite satellites capable of collecting Soviet SIGINT sit in a 22,300-mile geosynchronous orbit above the Horn of Africa and Borneo. These Rhyolites would certainly have been collecting SIGINT during K.A.L. 007's intrusions into Soviet territory. In addition, SIGINT "beach balls," spherical satellites, move around the globe in a nearly circular 300-mile orbit every 90 to 100 minutes and transmit information in short bursts to ground terminals. Photoreconnaissance satellites such as Big Bird and Keyhole also have the capability to monitor signals intelligence.

A recent article in the British magazine *Defence Attaché* charged that satellite intelligence collection might have been central to the K.A.L. 007 incident. It presented the case that as the airliner made each of its two entries into Soviet territory, a U.S. Ferret-D satellite was in a position to intercept electronic emissions, an allegation the Russians have made in arguing that Flight 007 was part of a carefully planned U.S. reconnaissance mission. The *Defence Attaché* article also charged that the space shuttle Challenger may have had a role that night in monitoring Soviet communications between the Far East and Moscow. Whether or not those specific charges are true, various U.S. agencies, using satellites, reconnaissance planes and ground-based listening posts, were tuned in as K.A.L. 007 headed for Soviet airspace.

If any of them somehow managed to be oblivious to the jetliner's peculiar path, they certainly had to be alerted by the scrambling of the Soviet interceptors over Kamchatka. When that happened, radar screens must have been ablaze with the converging images of the four Soviet fighters, the RC-135 and K.A.L. 007 near the Commander Islands. In addition, several Soviet reconnaissance aircraft were reportedly flying in the area at the time, as was K.A.L. Flight 015; the Russians claim there were other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in the vicinity as well. If such unusual activity went unnoticed, one of the most serious failures imaginable of the U.S. early warning system occurred that night. To postulate such a simultaneous failure of independent intelligence systems operated by the Navy, Army, Air Force, N.S.A., C.I.A. and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is hardly credible.

Should the fact of U.S. observation still be considered inconclusive, it must be remembered that our electronic ears told us on that August night that the Soviet SS-X-25 missile test was in its beginning stages. When a Soviet missile test or spacecraft launch is predicted or detected, the N.S.A.'s Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) in Fort Meade notifies a number of command centers. These include the White House situation room, the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, the alternate war rooms and NORAD headquarters. DEFSMAC also notifies all potential listening posts and signals intelligence sensors within the range of the test or launch to begin telemetry interception. As the test time draws near, RC-135 aircraft equipped to intercept telemetry transmissions from the missile are dispatched to the area. When the test takes place, the White House, NORAD, the Pentagon, the N.S.A. and other agencies are paying close attention in real time.

There can be little doubt that on the night of August 31, the extremely sophisticated, continuously vigilant U.S. and allied intelligence presence in the area was cranked up to the maximum to monitor the impending test of a secret and suspicious Soviet missile. All electronic eyes and ears were directed toward the exact place where K.A.L. 007 first intruded in Soviet territory, at precisely the time it was closest to the RC-135. Take another look at the map of Cobra Dane's radar coverage, on page 116. Imagine extensive

* The C.I.A. had no evidence on which to base this claim. One result of the erroneous report was that search and rescue missions did not get under way for several hours. Another was, of course, that it created enormous anguish for the families of those aboard K.A.L. 007.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

radar and electronic coverage by Cobra Judy, the U.S. station at Wakkanai and other U.S. and Japanese stations nearby. Then review the map of the flight path of the RC-135, on page 111, in light of the test of a highly interesting missile on Kamchatka, keeping in mind that the information all that hardware collects is transmitted in real time to the N.S.A., NORAD, the Pentagon, the White House and a number of other agencies and command centers. Far from slipping by unnoticed, K.A.L. 007 had flown onto center stage.

Entering Soviet Territory

At the time of the incident the press bought the Administration's claim that K.A.L. 007 should have been identifiable to the Soviets. With a length of 231 feet 10 inches, a wingspan of 195 feet 8 inches, a height of 63 feet 5 inches and a distinctive hump at the front of the fusilage, the 747 is one of the most easily identifiable aircraft in the skies. Capt. Thomas Ashwood, a pilot for Trans World Airlines and first vice president of the Air Line Pilots Association, said, "There's no way of mistaking a 747, even in darkness." Similarly, Larry Speakes commented, "Particularly with the visual and the radar information available to them, when they shot it down, they should have known irrefutably that it was a civilian airliner."

Nevertheless, having reviewed all available evidence, U.S. intelligence later found no indication that the Soviet Air Defense personnel knew K.A.L. 007 was a commercial airliner before the attack. The intelligence services concluded that the SU-15 fighter that shot it down was below and behind the Korean jetliner, where identification would have been difficult, and that the Soviet Air Defense Forces had displayed a poor capability to intercept aircraft over Soviet territory, to distinguish between commercial and military aircraft and to identify an aircraft before shooting it down. It also appears that the Russians suffered major communications failures during the incident; local commanders were apparently unable to communicate with one another or with the civilian and military leadership in Moscow. This may explain why the Russians have refused to release radar data or transcripts of conversations between ground stations and Soviet pilots.

Incompetence, however, may not account entirely for the Russians' confusion. The difficulties with Soviet radar detection and communications systems over Kamchatka and Sakhalin suggest that widespread electronic interference, also known as jamming or spoofing, may have been directed at the Soviet defense forces.

Certainly when Flight 007 transgressed the Soviet border it should have encountered an alerted Soviet C^3I system and been rapidly intercepted. After all, that bleak and forbidding region is of extreme strategic importance, housing major air, naval and land bases in the Soviet Far East Command. K.A.L. 007 flew over an area where the Soviet Union has launching sites for ballistic missiles and where tests with such missiles are conducted. In addition, the Russians claim that the jetliner passed over a critical base of their strategic nuclear forces: the submarine pens at Petropavlovsk, home port for an estimated thirty strategic missile subs, or about half the sea-based deterrent of the Soviet Union.

As sensitive as the locale was the time of the incident. According to *Air Force* magazine, the Soviet Air Defense Forces had recently undergone unprecedented changes. The Far East theater aviation organization, the Soviets' most advanced, had been fully operational only since December 16, 1982, and had never functioned under actual emergency. Moreover, for many months the Soviet Far East Command had been on extra alert for foreign planes that might be armed with American cruise missiles. It was also primed for large-scale joint military training operations by Japan and the United States, planned to take place in the area between September 25 and October 5. And of course it was especially alerted because of the test of the SS-X-25.

As background, it is important to understand that the Russians maintain a sixty-mile Aerospace Defense Identification Zone and that standard operating procedures require every aircraft entering the zone to be identified and reported to the National Command Post of the Air Defense Forces at Kalinin, near Moscow, before it is actually inside Soviet territory. But K.A.L. 007 had been inside Soviet territory for seven minutes before the first of four MIG-23 and SU-15 interceptors was scrambled over Kamchatka, at 1637 G.M.T. How can such a delay be explained?

It seems that the Soviet Air Defense Forces had trouble figuring out what the intruder was. *The New York Times* reported many of the analysts who examined the tapes and electronic reconnaissance information as saying that the Russians were operating on the assumption that a Soviet SU-15 was tracking a smaller RC-135, not a commercial jetliner. At an early point a radar operator said he had sighted an RC-135. Another said he had sighted an "unidentified" aircraft. Because of the complex flight path of the reconnaissance aircraft, its convergence with the flight path of K.A.L. 007, the airliner's reported change of altitude at the moment of convergence and its changed course shortly thereafter, it is not difficult to imagine at least some confusion.

But the interceptors scrambled over Kamchatka never did make contact with K.A.L. 007 and, according to U.S. intelligence officials, never came closer than twenty miles to the Korean airliner as it flew over the peninsula. If K.A.L. 007 was flying with its air navigation lights (ANOs) on at that time, the Soviet fighters should have seen it in the clear sky at 33,000 feet from as little as twenty miles away. That they did not suggests the airliner's ANOs were not on. Still, twenty miles is well within the approximately fifty-mile range of the tactical radar with which both the SU-15s and the MIG-23s are equipped. In addition, the interceptors would have been directed via radio by ground-control stations employing radar systems, some of which have a range of up to 500 miles. None of these radar systems seem to have been able to locate the jetliner. This suggests the presence of electronic countermeasures.

Confusion was not limited to the radar systems guiding the Soviet aircraft. Radar-guided SA-2 surface-to-air missile batteries near Petropavlovsk were ordered to fire on the airliner but were never able to obtain a solid radar lock

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the target.* And U.S. intelligence sources citing top-secret reports on the tragedy noted that there was an abysmal lack of coordination between the Soviet radar facilities on Kamchatka and those on Sakhalin Island. Jack Anderson reported in his syndicated column that the Kamchatka controllers, after first confusing the 747 with the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft that had been in the area earlier, failed to "hand over" the intruder to their comrades on Sakhalin. Crucial time was lost before anyone realized it was the same plane.

The Russians say that the first interceptor on Sakhalin took off at 1742 G.M.T., before K.A.L. 007 made its second intrusion into Soviet airspace. Yet the Soviet SU-15 pilot who eventually fired the missile that downed K.A.L. 007 did not report to ground control that he saw the "target" until 1805:56. It was not for another six minutes that the same pilot reported that he saw the target on radar. Although the United States and the Soviet Union have both refused to release transcripts of the conversations of the Soviet ground controllers, the conversations between the interceptor pilots indicate that ground control stations were also having difficulties. At 1818:09 the pilot of a MIG-23 interceptor reported that Karnaval, one of the ground control stations, "does not see." The only way ground stations can see anything is, of course, by radar.

One last bit of evidence that jamming might have been going on: The SU-15 is equipped with two Anab AA-3 air-to-air missiles; one is heat-seeking, the other radar-guided. Both missiles were launched. The heat-seeking missile homed in on the heat produced by the engines of the jetliner. The radar-guided missile missed.

If jamming was going on, it could have come from any number of sources. The RC-135 carries equipment, manned by Strategic Air Command electronic warfare officers, that can be used to jam radar and radio transmissions and certain electronic systems in other aircraft. But jamming can also be done from a variety of land- and sea-based platforms, many of which were in the area at the time. From the public record it is impossible to determine who might have been responsible for jamming Soviet radar, but that it was jammed certainly seems a distinct possibility. If electronic countermeasures were used, the disquieting implication is that K.A.L. 007's intrusion into Soviet airspace, far from being accidental, was well orchestrated and that those measures were taken in an effort to protect the airliner and those on board. This also might explain why K.A.L. 007's pilot was willing to fly the perilous route over Soviet territory.

Sakhalin and the Evasion

The first U.S. accounts of the incident contended that the Russians made no attempt to contact K.A.L. 007 before shooting it down, but this assertion has been discredited by subsequent revelations of evidence. Not only did the Russians make such attempts, but the airliner's pilot deliberately ignored them and took evasive action.

As the map below illustrates, on the late part of its flight K.A.L. 007 flew on a heading of approximately 240 degrees, essentially parallel to R-20. The Russians claim that at 1802 it sharply changed course, evaded positions of air defense missile units and passed over key military installations on the southern end of Sakhalin Island. Even in the absence of transcripts of ground-control transmissions, there is evidence that K.A.L. 007 did change its course.

The transmissions of the Soviet interceptor pilots show that at 1809, clearly in response to a query from ground control, the SU-15 pilot who eventually shot down Flight 007 said, "Yes, it has turned." At 1809:44, the pilot was ordered by ground control to execute a course of 240 degrees. At 1813:35, the pilot reported that the target aircraft was now on a course of 240 degrees. But according to the 1809 report, K.A.L. 007 had already changed its course a few minutes before. To have resumed a course of 240 degrees at 1813:35, Flight 007 must have been on some other heading prior to that, leading to the conclusion that K.A.L. 007 indeed changed course as it approached Sakhalin. This is confirmed by Japanese radar data cited in the I.C.A.O. report.

Then there is the matter of the lights. At 1810:51, in response to an instruction from ground control, the pilot of the SU-15 responded, "Roger, [the] light is blinking." U.S. officials have interpreted this to mean that the Soviet pilot

Reconstruction of Flight Path of K.A.L. 007 From Kamchatka to Sakhalin



SOURCE: David Pearson

* Canadian Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard Rohmer, retired, wrote in his book, *Massacre 747*, that the Soviets have fired more than 100 radar-guided surface-to-air missiles at RC-135s in the Kamchatka/Kuril region. "Their score," he said, "is an amazing zero." Such a statistic raises two possibilities: either the Russians are unbelievably incompetent or their radar has been subjected to considerable electronic interference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had seen the lights of K.A.L. 007. Given the context of the communications, however, a more likely interpretation is that the SU-15 pilot received instructions to flash his lights, the first step in a series of procedures designed by the I.C.A.O. for intercepting intruding aircraft.

At 1813:16, the pilot of the SU-15 replied to another instruction from ground control. "Roger," he said. Ten seconds later, according to the U.S. translation of the transmissions, the pilot reported back to ground control, "The target isn't responding to I.F.F. [Identification/Friend or Foe]." If I.F.F., a military procedure, was used, it is clear the Russians believed they were dealing with a hostile military aircraft. But in its final report, the I.C.A.O. team investigating the incident translated that message as, "The target isn't responding to the call." "The call" might refer to an attempt to contact K.A.L. 007 on the international hailing frequencies of 121.5 or 243.0 megahertz. U.S. officials claimed that Soviet aircraft are not equipped with radio compatible with those frequencies. "This is to preclude defection by Soviet air crews," one official said. The Russians insist their aircraft are so equipped, and U.S. Air Force Chief of Intelligence Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., retired, agrees. He said that he had personal knowledge that the SU-15 that shot down K.A.L. 007 had radio that was compatible with the 121.5 frequency.

If the I.C.A.O. translation is correct, the Soviet pilot may well have used the international hailing frequency in accordance with accepted interception procedures. Yet, the transcripts show no response from K.A.L. 007.

Whichever interpretation is correct, however, it seems probable that Soviet ground control stations were laying out, step by step, the interception procedures to be used by the Soviet Air Defense aircraft. At 1818:12, the pilot of the SU-15 asked ground control to repeat an instruction. Ground control did so, and at 1818:19, the pilot reported that he was "executing." What was he executing? The answer came just a few seconds later, at 1818:34, when the pilot reported to ground control, "The ANOs are burning. The [strobe] light is flashing." As with the earlier reference to lights, this has been reported in the United States as meaning that the Soviet pilot had seen K.A.L. 007's lights. But since the Soviet pilot was executing an instruction and did not mention to whom the lights belonged, it is more likely that it was the SU-15's lights that were flashing, as the next step in the interception procedures. Indeed, in the revised transcripts of the transmissions released by the State Department on September 11, 1983, the pilot reported just a few seconds later, at 1819:08, "They do not see me." Apparently the Soviet pilot was instructed to flash his lights; he did so, but the Korean pilot did not respond.

The next step in the sequence of internationally accepted interception procedures is to fire warning shots along the path of the intruding aircraft. The revised transcripts show that at 1820:49 the Soviet pilot reported to ground control, "I am firing cannon bursts."* At 1821:24, he reported, "I'm approaching the target. I'm going in closer." Eleven seconds later, at 1821:35, the pilot of the SU-15 said, "The target's light is blinking." That was the first time the lights were attributed to the target aircraft. "I have already approached the target to a distance of about two kilometers," the pilot continued. It appears the pilot of K.A.L. 007, realizing he was being intercepted, turned on his lights as a signal that he would comply with the instructions of the SU-15.

But the interception did not proceed as might be expected. At 1822:02, the Soviet pilot reported, "The target is decreasing speed." At 1822:17, he said: "I am going around it. I'm already moving in front of the target." A few seconds later, the pilot of K.A.L. 007 radioed to Tokyo air-traffic control that he had begun an ascent to 35,000 feet. But apparently such an ascent never took place. At 1821:40, before K.A.L. 007 began its alleged ascent, the Soviet pilot reported the airliner's altitude as 33,000 feet. At 1823:05, K.A.L. 007 reported that it had reached 35,000 feet. But five seconds later, the Soviet pilot again reported the airliner's altitude as 33,000 feet. Since the decrease in speed evidently was not the result of an ascent, it seems that it may have been an evasive maneuver.

It was only after he had flashed his lights, fired warning shots and seen the Korean airliner change its direction and speed that the pilot of the SU-15 said to ground control at 1823:37: "I'm dropping back. Now I will try rockets." During the next minutes, Soviet ground control gave additional instructions, and at 1826:20, the Soviet pilot reported the fateful words: "I have executed the launch. The target is destroyed."

A number of high-level U.S. officials quickly concluded that Flight 007 had taken evasive actions. Former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner commented on September 1 that it was "difficult to divine" why the pilot of K.A.L. 007 did not respond to Soviet signals. Prior to the downing of K.A.L. Flight 902 in 1978, the same thing had happened: "When the Soviets gave the signals," Turner said, "the pilot didn't obey." But later the U.S. line hardened, and officials explained the anomalies in the transcript by saying that perhaps there was mechanical failure or human error, or that the pilot of K.A.L. 007 was somehow unaware he was being pursued. If the discussion of the tragic odyssey of the Korean Air Lines jumbo jet remains on the level of individual incompetence and the failures of individual pieces of electronic equipment, then other explanations of the airliner's peculiar actions need never be entertained. Those individuals and pieces of equipment were destroyed when they fell into the Sea of Japan.

The Theories

In the past year a variety of theories have attempted to explain the irrefutable fact of K.A.L. 007's deviation from course. One of the most persistent has been that the pilot was taking a shortcut to conserve fuel. Exponents of this theory portray the K.A.L. pilots as daredevils, aggressive sky jockeys who would risk the lives of passengers to save a few hundred dollars in operating costs. This is neither consistent with the record of Flight 007's pilot nor credible

* For reasons never made clear, this extraordinary addition to the transcripts, damaging to the U.S. case, was not contained in the original version or in the I.C.A.O. report released in December.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

given the course it flew. The route that would have saved the most money—a Great Circle route—was not flown. Furthermore, on the course that was flown there was no reason to veer over Sakhalin Island, a change that added time, distance and danger. But the principal problem with this theory is that it does not account for the actions of the United States. Unless the U.S. intelligence and early warning system was beset with unprecedented failures, someone monitoring the data from the stations at King Salmon, Cape Newenham, Shemya Island, on board the RC-135 or at stations in Japan surely should have taken steps to notify the Korean airliner. Yet there is no evidence that anyone did. Had the Korean pilot flown into Soviet territory disregarding U.S. warnings, the actions of the United States government subsequent to the incident would no doubt have been markedly different.

Another theory is that K.A.L. 007's pilot and co-pilot made a series of errors. The automatic pilot, it has been said, was set on its heading mode rather than on its inertial navigation systems mode. If that happened, it means two experienced pilots sat in their cockpit for five hours, facing the autopilot selector switch directly in front of them at eye level, yet failed to see that it was set improperly. It means they did not use a single I.N.S. unit to display the cross-track/track error position of the aircraft, a standard operating procedure. It means they failed to use their two airborne radar systems in mapping mode, although this is recommended I.C.A.O. procedure and a standard practice for pilots on the North Pacific routes. It means they misread instruments that gave their direction to the Visual Omni Range directional beacon at Bethel, as well as the digital readouts on their distance measuring equipment. For a pilot with 10,627 flight hours and a co-pilot with 8,917 flight hours, such a series of errors is extremely improbable. The I.C.A.O.'s Air Navigation Commission said, "The Commission found it difficult to validate and endorse the conclusions connected with the [human error] scenarios . . . because any one of them contained some points which could not be ex-

ZERO NET MIGRATION

Join us in our efforts to make *Zero Net Migration* the cornerstone of our national policy on immigration. *Zero Net Migration* means that each year immigration (in-migration) would not exceed emigration (out-migration), so that net migration would no longer contribute to U.S. population growth.

A policy of *Zero Net Migration* would require reducing the annual quota for legal immigration to an OVERALL CEILING of about 100,000. This ceiling should include all relatives and refugees, who now enter outside of quota (there were over 600,000 legal immigrants in 1982).

Write today for our *free brochure.*

NEGATIVE POPULATION GROWTH, INC.,
16 East 42nd Street, Suite 1042
(H-5), New York, NY 10017.

THINK OF YOUR CHILDREN

The chances for nuclear war have never been greater. Each one of us has the power to turn our course away from self-fulfilling preparation for war.

Dr. Helen Caldicott

shows how we can take effective action *now* to protect our children's future.

A sparkling new, 50-minute

Video Cassette "The Crossroads of Time"

features Dr. Caldicott, with music to lift the spirit and visionary art and photography to delight the eye. Deeply moving, perhaps the most important video you'll ever watch.

INVEST IN OUR FUTURE — share this uniquely inspiring experience with family, friends, church, and community.

$25 PRE-ELECTION SPECIAL $25

VHS or Beta (please specify), $25 now through Nov. 1, 1984, plus $4 shipping & handling. Audio cassette $5, plus $4 shipping & handling (any number). California residents add 6% sales tax.

PEACEFUL PLANET PRODUCTIONS, Inc.
1705 Joy Ridge Rd., Box NAT Bodega, CA 94922-0150

Acclaim for Seymour Melman's PROFITS WITHOUT PRODUCTION

The N. Y. Times hails

"A penetrating analysis

of what has hitherto been blamed on such vagaries as lack of gumption or the superiority of Japanese genes."
—Christopher Lehmann-Haupt

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH writes:

"In the last years the best young economists have been breaking out of the mainstream to show how the emerging industrial structure yields impressively less than the reputable text-book results. And how military expenditure contributes to this shortfall. Seymour Melman was a pioneer in this line of work. [This book] is the highly informed result of his research, experience and thought."

"Melman's thesis strikes at the heart of a much debated current issue, the relative decline in U.S. productivity compared with that of Japan, West Germany, and other developed countries...[What is] important and provocative is his skillfully argued contention that it is the cost-plus mentality of the military and defense industry that is responsible for the precipitous decline of much of the U.S. industrial sector."—Library Journal

Published by Alfred•A•Knopf

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CULTURE SHOCK

CLASH OF CULTURES
Brian M. Fagan

The period when Western civilization first came into contact with the full range of human biological and cultural diversity is one of the most momentous in modern history. *Clash of Cultures* is the captivating story of that interaction, the legacies of which haunt us to this very day. Internationally known archaeologist Brian Fagan describes the first discovery of non-Western societies, the intellectual fallout from encounters with American Indians, and the often strange and haunting perceptions of other societies held by armchair travelers through the centuries.

Available at fine bookstores.
Cloth: **$28.95** (ISBN 0-7167-1634-8)
Paper: **$15.95** (ISBN 0-7167-1622-4)
W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY
4419 West 1980 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104

MARTIN JAY

MARXISM AND TOTALITY
The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas

Ever since Georg Lukács announced that it was not the primacy of economics that distinguished Marxist from bourgeois thought, but rather "the category of totality," Marxists have been preoccupied with the search for a workable concept of totality. By closely following the adventures of this troublesome but central concept, Jay offers an unconventional account of Western Marxism undercutting the traditional division into scientific and critical wings.
$29.50 at bookstores

University of California Press
Berkeley 94720

plained satisfactorily." Finally, human error does not explain why K.A.L. 007 veered from course only after leaving the range of civilian air-traffic control radar, why it may have changed course at the time of its rendezvous with the RC-135, why it changed course again and made evasive maneuvers over Sakhalin. Canadian Maj. Gen. Richard Rohmer, retired, noted of the airliner's pilots, "Yes, they knew exactly where they were from the time they left Anchorage through the false way point checks that they transmitted past Kamchatka and over Sakhalin Island to their destruction."

Which leaves us with the most persuasive theory: that the airliner made a deliberate, carefully planned intrusion into Soviet territory with the knowledge of U.S. military and intelligence agencies. Its object would probably have been to activate Soviet Air Defense Forces. All the evidence points in that direction. Yet even the best-laid plans can go awry. It is unlikely that the Soviet test of the SS-X-25 ICBM was taken into account. Such a test, occurring within the Soviet Union and employing only a single re-entry vehicle, would not have been announced ahead of time and was probably detected only several hours before K.A.L. 007 first intruded into Soviet territory. An intelligence mission for the airliner would have been planned much farther in advance. And in all probability it would not have been intended that 269 people lose their lives. Pilots, even aggressive ones, do not fly suicide missions. K.A.L. 007's pilot may well have believed that electronic countermeasures would be used to safeguard the flight of the airliner.

To make the point of U.S. knowledge of the deviation of K.A.L. 007, however, it really matters very little whether the pilot of the airliner was acting on instructions from the U.S. or Korean intelligence communities or whether he simply blundered into the area. The conclusion is the same: U.S. military and intelligence personnel could have taken steps to contact Flight 007, to correct its fatal course in time, but they elected not to. Why? Perhaps because the intelligence bonanza offered by the intrusion of the aircraft at that place at that time was too compelling to resist—



Our Future In Our Hands

Take effective action *Now* against those that play Russian Roulette with our lives, those of our children, and our planet. In the crossroads of time

DR. HELEN CALDICOTT
shows us the way.

View Her dynamic assessment of the current arms race and the political, moral, and ethical choices before us. *Show*

THE CROSSROADS OF TIME
to your family, friends, community — then *Together*, starting now before the November elections, take appropriate action to save life on earth.

A Sparkling New **VIDEO CASSETTE**, **"The Crossroads of Time"**, is the most powerful, life-affirming video of its kind yet produced.

Now being made available close to cost to be of maximum assistance to those working for Peace. Buy it at our **$25 PRE-ELECTION SPECIAL**

VHS or Beta (please specify), $25 now thru Nov. 1, 1984, plus $4 shipping and handling. Audio cassette $5, plus $4 shipping and handling, (any number). California residents add 6% sales tax.

PEACEFUL PLANET PRODUCTIONS
1705 Joy Ridge Road
Bodega, CA 94922-0150

GayCommunityNews

Gay Community News is the national political newsweekly on the cutting edge of sexual politics and liberation.

In times such as these, issues such as the direction which our movement takes, its actions and reactions, who makes the decisions and for what reasons, are critical. For over ten years *Gay Community News* has been dedicated to the principle that an informed community is our greatest asset.

Each week, *GCN* brings you current, incisive news and analysis about lesbian and gay liberation. **Stay informed about the issues affecting you. Subscribe today.**

"The gay movement's newspaper of record." — *The Village Voice*

Subscriptions are available for $29.00 for 50 issues (1 year) and $17.00 for 25 issues. Special introductory offer: 12 weeks/$8.00.

Send check or money order to *Gay Community News*, 167 Tremont Street, Suite 53, Boston, MA 02111.

GCN is published by the non-profit, tax-exempt Bromfield Street Educational Foundation.

When drafting your will, please consider making a bequest to *The Nation*.

For information, write or call: Office of the Publisher, *The Nation*, 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011 (212) 242-8400.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more compelling than the danger to 269 lives.

Those making the decisions on behalf of the American people may have known of the Russians' historic sensitivity to intrusions into their airspace, but they also could have believed that the Russians would identify the easily recognizable 747 commercial airliner and never shoot it from the sky. They may have assumed that, at worst, the Russians would force the plane to land, as they had often done at sensitive times in the past. It must be remembered that this, too, was a sensitive time. Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko were planning to meet at the thirty-five-nation Review Conference on European Security in Madrid about a week later to sign a document that had been negotiated for three years to further East-West cooperation—including the sale of high-technology equipment to the Soviet Union. U.S. officials also knew that the Russians were still trying to prevent the deployment of U.S. Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The forum for discussing that deployment was the medium-range nuclear forces talks in Geneva, which were scheduled to resume on September 6.*

At such a time, U.S. officials may have assumed, it would have been extraordinarily foolish of the Russians to shoot down an easily identifiable commercial jumbo jet. With parallel reasoning, though, it would have been an ideal time for a U.S. intelligence mission employing just such an aircraft. How can that possibility be reconciled with the consistent U.S. denial that K.A.L. 007 was on an intelligence-gathering mission? One compelling answer is that the airliner itself may have carried no equipment for gathering intelligence. Its only mission would have been to bring the Soviet Air Defense Forces into a state of alert. U.S. air-, sea- and land-based intelligence platforms were in the area for the actual gathering of the intelligence information.

* Predictably, the resumed talks were darkened by what U.S. negotiator Paul H. Nitze called the "irresponsible Soviet action in downing K.A.L. 007." It was strikingly reminiscent of the many earlier incidents in which the territory of the Soviet Union had been violated just when the two superpowers were engaged in or seeking to resume arms control negotiations.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP, INC.
162 MADISON AVENUE, 3rd FLOOR, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016 (212) 679-4577

Working for Peace and Understanding since 1943

24 Local Societies Across the Country

People-to-People Travel to the USSR

Documentary Films, Quarterly Newsletter

List of Publications

Announcing

PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP
edited by David Copp and Susan Wendell
This important new book facilitates rational and informed debate on the topic of pornography and censorship by collecting in one volume related studies from philosophy, the social sciences, and law and provides a wide range of points of view on the subject.

"A major contribution . . . requires serious thought about moral values."
—*Los Angeles Times*

414 pages
ISBN 0-87975-181-9 Cloth $22.95

IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR HUMANISM
Paul Kurtz
Secular humanism has been violently denounced by fundamentalist churchmen and powerful right-wing politicians as "the most dangerous religion in America." This book, by a leading humanist philosopher, responds to the criticism and presents a reasoned defense of the humanist philosophy.

"Written in the tradition of good philosophy."
—*Dallas Times-Herald*

273 pages
ISBN 0-87975-221-1 Cloth $16.95

VITAMIN POLITICS
John Fried
Americans are squandering nearly $3 billion a year on vitamins that are either useless or actually damaging to their health, contends John Fried.

"Well written, informative, and interesting, and includes insights into the people and situations that have contributed to the controversy."
—*Library Journal*

239 pages
ISBN 0-87975-222-X Paper $9.95

Order from your local bookstore or directly from the publisher. Send payment plus $1.50 for the first book, 50¢ for each additional book to:

PROMETHEUS BOOKS
700 East Amherst St., Buffalo, NY 14215

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congressional Inquiry

The seriousness of the issues raised in this article and the accumulating weight of evidence discrediting official U.S. government explanations of the K.A.L. 007 incident demand a full-scale Congressional investigation. Following are some questions that must be addressed:

- Why was K.A.L. 007 delayed in its departure from Anchorage?
- Why didn't U.S. military stations in Alaska notify civilian air-traffic controllers of the airliner's course deviation?
- Data recorded by military radar stations at King Salmon and Cape Newenham could establish with certainty whether K.A.L. 007's pilot made early course corrections. Why are those data being withheld from the public?
- Why did K.A.L. 007's pilot falsify his fuel and position reports?
- Why was K.A.L. 015 filing reports for K.A.L. 007 with air-traffic controllers in Anchorage when 007's radio was fully operational?
- Official statements by Secretary of State Shultz indicate that the United States intercepted Soviet radar data from Kamchatka. What do those data say about the alleged rendezvous of K.A.L. 007 and the RC-135, and why have they not been made public?
- Was there any connection between K.A.L. 007's change of course prior to entering Soviet airspace over Kamchatka and its close approach to the RC-135?
- Were U.S. reconnaissance aircraft tuned in to Soviet ground-to-air and air-to-ground communications over Kamchatka and Sakhalin? If so, why have those communications not been made public?
- Did the United States pressure the Japanese government to withhold relevant information it had collected? Specifically, why have the Japanese not made public Soviet ground-to-air communications, which could clarify the time and location of K.A.L. 007's turn to the north as it approached Sakhalin? And why have they not made public complete altitude data for K.A.L. 007 over the Sea of Okhotsk and Sakhalin Island, which could shed light on what appear to be K.A.L. 007's evasive actions?
- When did President Reagan, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Shultz find out about K.A.L. 007's deviation from course and the shootdown; i.e. what did they know and when did they know it?
- Were there failures of U.S. communications systems during the incident? Specifically, of Wimex or DIN/DSSCS?
- Was there, as *Defence Attaché* charged, a planned coordination between the orbits of the U.S. Ferret-D satellite and the passage of K.A.L. 007 over Kamchatka and Sakhalin?
- Why won't the United States make public the conversations of Soviet ground stations?
- Why didn't K.A.L. 007 respond to Soviet interception signals?
- Why did K.A.L. 007 change course near Sakhalin?
- Why did K.A.L. 007 report a change in altitude when apparently none occurred at that time?
- Was there a cover-up by U.S. officials?

At a minimum, it appears that the President and his Administration misled the press and the world concerning what they knew about the K.A.L. 007 incident and when they knew it. Beyond that, it appears probable that they risked 269 lives in the hope of gathering information about Soviet defense systems. If these surmises are unwarranted, then the elaborate and complex system of intelligence, warnings and security that the U.S. has built up over decades suffered an unprecedented and mind-boggling breakdown. Either way, now, a year after this bizarre episode, Congress owes it to the passengers of K.A.L. 007, their families, the people of the United States and the world community to conduct a full and thorough investigation, to let the truth be known. In a democratic society, there must be limits to the damage that can be inflicted in the name of "national security."

We cannot control the paranoia of a Soviet society that shoots when in doubt, whether on orders from above or on impulse from below. We can and should, however, take responsibility for our own contribution to this tragedy and the tensions, fears and international disorder that it has promoted. □

EVENTS.

ROSENBERG DEBATE UPDATE

The historic debate, "Were the Rosenbergs Framed?" sponsored by *The Nation* and *The New Republic* at Town Hall on October 20, can now be purchased in typed transcript ($24) and/or tape cassette ($19). Special discounts are available on orders of five or more. Send check or money order payable to The Nation to: "Rosenbergs," The Nation, 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011. (A project of the Nation Institute.)

CARIBBEAN CONFERENCE

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CARIBBEAN STUDIES:
Toward the 21st Century
and
Prospects for Caribbean Basin Integration

With prominent Caribbean scholars and policy-makers.

AUGUST 28 to SEPTEMBER 1

Hunter College
Lexington Avenue and 68th Street
New York City

For further information, contact RISM, 162 East 78th Street, New York, NY 10021. (212) 535-8448.

Sponsored by Research Institute for the Study of Man, in cooperation with the City University of New York.

K.A.L. 007

What the U.S. Knew And When We Knew It

This exciting and thought-provoking issue of The Nation may be obtained at low bulk rates for your class, organization or friends.

1-9 copies	$3.00 each
10-49 copies	$1.50 each
50-99 copies	$1.00 each
100-499 copies	$ .75 each
500 or more copies	$ .50 each

Prepayment is required. (U.S. currency only.) N.Y.S. residents must add sales tax. Please make check or money order payable to The Nation, 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011.

Quantity _____ Amount enclosed _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Phone _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED.

While we reserve the right to refuse any advertisement that we believe to be fraudulent, illegal or offensive, The Nation *wishes its readers to know: a) we do not have the facilities to check out the promises made by our advertisers; and b) we have a strong presumption against censoring any advertisement, especially if we disagree with its politics.*

ANTIQUE COLLECTIBLES

PAPERWEIGHTS
Rick Ayottes pair Blue Titmice - $400.
Color **Quarterly** of modern and antique weights - $5 year.
GEORGE KAMM
Box N-254
Lititz, Pa. 17543

ARTISTS' GRANTS

ARTISTS! CASH GRANTS! Available all fields. Cash from foundations, corporations, governments. Ask for free valuable report. WIAL, Box 15240, Washington, DC 20003.

ASSOCIATIONS

NATIONAL WRITERS UNION. Collective bargaining. Grievance procedures. Health insurance. Journalists, authors, poets, commercial writers. National Writers Union, Box C, 13 Astor Place, New York, NY 10003.

ANIMALS HAVE RIGHTS, TOO. Most "humane" organizations only want to regulate the big business of vivisection. We seek total abolition of animal experimentation—because it is cruel, because it violates animals' rights, and because it is medically worthless. For information, send $1 contribution to our nonprofit work. CIVITAS, Box 26-N, Swain, NY 14884.

BOOKS

THIRD WORLD RESOURCE DIRECTORY. Annotated, comprehensive listings of organizations, publications, audio-visuals on Third World regions and issues. 304 pages. $12.95 until 7/31/84; $17.95 thereafter. Orbis Books, Dept. NT, Maryknoll, NY 10545.

Now!... the book that challenges perilous conservative and tired liberal ideologies with a bold, new agenda ..."*LOOKING FORWARD*" by Charles Stoddard, Wisconsin Progressive leader. 305 pgs. hard-cover. Send $10 to A.J. Publications, Box 3012-A, Duluth, Minn. 55803.

UNDER LINCOLN the United States became a stern despotism. Box 2128. South Vineland, NJ 08360.

SCHOLARLY BOOKLET PROVES JESUS NEVER EXISTED!

Conclusive proof Flavius Josephus created fictional Jesus, authored Gospels. AMAZING but **ABSOLUTELY INCONTROVERTIBLE!** Send $4 to Vector Associates, Box 6215-B, Bellevue, WA 98008. Or request details.

BOOK SEARCH SERVICE

STILL LOOKING FOR A BOOK? Free Search. Write: Sperling Books, Dept. A, Box 1766, Madison Square Station, New York, NY 10159.

FIFTY YEARS EXPERIENCE finding out-of-print and rare books—ANY, any language. ARTHUR MEYERFELD, 1830 Eaton, San Carlos, CA 94070.

BOOK SEARCH: We find scholarly, general out-of-print and rare books. Free search—reasonable prices. Please address requests: METROPOL BOOKS, Box 1374, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025, (212) 865-8195. Lists welcome.

BUMPER STICKERS

NEW CLEAR LIFE, NOT NUCLEAR DEATH, quality bumper sticker. $2 to BRW, Suite 775E, 8323 Lincoln, Westchester, CA 90045.

GET THAT WARMONGER OUT OF THE WHITE HOUSE

Union-printed, red-white-blue, vinyl, 15-inch bumper sticker. Send self-addressed, stamped envelope and $2 to JWG-d, Box 6019, Waco, TX 76706. Quantity discounts.

KICK THE MISSILE labels (1"x1") 3 pkgs. of 100 ea., $5 plus 75¢ postage.

KICK THE BOMB HABIT bumper stickers $1.50 ea., plus 50¢ postage.

Residents of Wash. State add 7.9% sales tax. Cause-Way, PO Box 15897, Seattle, WA 98115.

CALLIGRAPHY

Invitations Menus Quotations
Placcards Ads Posters
Certificates Lowletters

Calligraphy
for all occasions

Call or write for a free estimate

Margo Dittmer (212) 777-4053
332 East 11th St., N.Y., N.Y. 10003

EDUCATION

LEARN 10 LANGUAGES a year while striding for exercise. 200 Language Club, Box 1727, Beverly Hills, CA 90213.

STUDY SPANISH IN NICARAGUA

Learn about the revolution firsthand.

Year-round course offerings.

Casa Nicaraguense de Español.

Phone (212) 949-4126 or write: 70 Greenwich Ave., #559, New York, NY 10011.

HEALTH

HAS YOUR TIME COME? Discover your own power to have ANY health problem clear up. Two 20-cent stamps. Cause, Box 18412, Irvine, CA 92714.

INSURANCE

DONALD SHAFFER ASSOCIATES, INC.
INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
Specialists in Pension & Employee Benefit Planning
11 GRACE AVENUE, Great Neck, NY 11021
212-895-7005, 516-466-4642

MERCHANDISE

RONALD REAGAN *IS WATCHING* YOU
(on Reverse Side of T-Shirt)



1984 T-SHIRTS
Beautiful Red
Silkscreened 2 Sides (S, M, L, XL) $9.95 Post Paid. Send Check or m/o: Newspeak Designs 70 Greenwich Av. Suite 410E, NYC 10011

GERMAN GREEN PARTY programs, $3.50; red flag lapel pins, $1. Postpaid. Free catalogue. Socialist Party Favors, Box 8211-N, Des Moines, IA 50306.

"REAGAN RODEO/Human Life Amendment," outrageous 45 disc by the Rio Risbee Band. Send $2.50 ppd. to: Solar Cycles, R.F.D. 279, Rockland, ME 04841.



ANTI-REAGAN T-SHIRTS

"Don't Give Him The Chance" with Reagan quote under cartoon. $8.25 each S-M-L-XL in tan, blue and yellow. 100% cotton; quantity discounts. Send for FREE CATALOG of more environmental, wildlife, anti-Reagan and anti-nuke designs. Satisfaction Guaranteed. Jim Morris T-Shirts, PO Box 2308 Dept. TH4, Boulder, CO 80306, or call (303) 444-6430. **SHARE THE EARTH**

MISCELLANEOUS

INFORMATION DESIRED on translators of Miguel Angel Asturias. Write E.B. Clark, 4326-D Grande Court NW, Albuquerque, NM 87107.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED.

MONEY-MAKING OPPORTUNITIES

MILLIONS in used books in garage sales and attics waiting to be bought cheap and sold at high profits. We can help get your share of this treasure. For details send $2 to Nationwide Book Mart, 6833 South Gessner, #344, Houston, TX 77036.

PERSONALS

SOPHISTICATED SCANDINAVIANS, all ages, seek *enlightened correspondence, lasting relationships.* Details: SCANNA-N, Box 4, Pittsford, NY 14534.

UNATTACHED? Meet aware, literate singles. Lowest fee. Call DATELINE—free: 800-451-3245.

ORIENTAL WOMEN wish to correspond with Americans. Cherry Blossoms, Box 1021NA, Honokaa, HI 96727.

SINGLE PROFILE NEXUS creates a nationwide network of cultured singles. Box 19983, Orlando, FL 32814.

OVER 40? Single? Seeking respectable companions? Write Over 40 Clubs, Box 309, West Chester, PA 19381, or Box 8502, Albuquerque, NM 87198.

FUNNY, THINKING WOMAN seeks single, mature, resolute, kindly man who wants friendship/love. Write Nation Box 16.

POSITIONS AVAILABLE

EDITING and descriptive writing assistant. Full- or part-time. Stamford, Connecticut. Historical, fictionalized novel, Nazi occupation of Paris. Dr. A.B. Weinstein, 30 Ralsey Road South, Stamford, CT 06902.

GOVERNMENT JOBS. $16,559-$50,553/year. Now hiring. Your area. Call (805) 687-6000, ext. R-3596.

MEMBERSHIP COORDINATOR for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The membership coordinator is responsible for growth and branch development for the organization. Must be creative, have good communication skills (including writing and speaking) and a willingness to travel. Experience in organizing and an understanding of peace and social justice issues. Salary $13,500. Send resume, writing samples to the Administrative Director, WILPF, 1213 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19107.

POSITIONS AVAILABLE

SECRETARY to the editor of an independent weekly. Position starts September 15. Typing skills essential. Steno desirable. EOE. Send resume and cover letter to Nation Box 4.

POSITIONS DESIRED

ANOTHER HUNGRY NATION INTERN seeks evening work proofreading, typing, etc. Call Jackie Stevens at (212) 242-8400, days.

WASHINGTON AREA proofreading, typing, etc. Call Steve Harvey, (202) 546-2239.

PUBLICATIONS

TECHNOCRACY-TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIAL DESIGN available for $1 from Technocracy Inc., Continental Headquarters, Savannah, OH 44874.

FREE 61-page pamphlet, "Capitalism and Unemployment," with $4 for one-year subscription to biweekly socialist newspaper. The People (N), 914 Industrial Ave., Palo Alto, CA 94303.

THE ROSENBERG DEBATE TAPES. The historic debate, "Were the Rosenbergs Framed?" sponsored by The Nation and The New Republic at Town Hall on October 20, can now be purchased in typed transcript and/or cassette tape form. Complete transcripts are available for $24 each; tape cassettes are $19 each. Special discounts are available on orders of five or more. Send check or mail order payable to The Nation to: "Rosenbergs," The Nation, 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011. If you'd like more information, call Mr. Monaco at (212) 242-8400. (A project of The Nation Institute.)

BEST WAY TO FOLLOW NEWS OF THE MIDEAST: monthly selection of best press coverage from 125 English-language periodicals, plus chronology, editorial and opinion review, critical media analysis, guide to new documents, retrieval service. Complete media guide in magazine format. $48 annual subscription for individuals; write for foreign and institutional rates or for FREE SAMPLE COPY. Claremont Research, Department N, 160 Claremont Avenue, New York, NY 10027.

PUBLICATIONS

GERMAN GAS CHAMBERS A HOAX? Illustrated report and catalogue of banned books, $3. Cobra, Box 627, Ithaca, NY 14851.

FREE—merely send self-addressed stamped envelope for two unique songs entitled "God Is a Commie," and "Prodigy Politician." Dick Hildebrandt, 3000 Monroe Avenue, N.W., Grand Rapids, MI 49505.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REPORTS, a new journal by workers designed to build connections between workers across national boundaries, especially between workers in "developed" countries and workers in the Third World. Sample copies, $3; one-year subscription (6 issues), $20. (Includes air-mail postage from England.) International Labour Reports-U.S., Box 882391, San Francisco, CA 94188.

RECIPES

DELICIOUS—12 unusual recipes from Cookee's Cozy Kitchen, Volume 1. Low-cost dishes that make expensive-tasting meals! Send $1.50 to Cookee Klein, Box 604, New York, NY 10040.

RELIGION

THE WORLD HAS HAD *enough* ...
OF HUNGER, INJUSTICE, WAR.

IN ANSWER TO OUR CALL FOR HELP,
AS WORLD TEACHER FOR ALL HUMANITY,

THE CHRIST IS NOW HERE.

HOW WILL WE RECOGNIZE HIM?

●

WHO IS THE CHRIST?

●

WHAT IS HE SAYING?

●

WHEN WILL WE SEE HIM?

Without sharing there can be no justice.
Without justice there can be no peace.
Without peace there can be no future.

TARA CENTER
P.O. Box 6001, #8, N. Hollywood, CA 91603

TRAVEL

Freighter Cruises
First Class For $100 or Less Daily!

Discover the luxury cruise you've dreamed of. *TravLtips Cruise & Freighter Travel Association* will show you how. Membership includes:

- *FREE* bi-monthly publication describing cruises in detail, schedules, fares and facts
- Personalized help with trip planning
- Eligibility for exclusive voyages
- Membership fee applied to first cruise

$15.00 (one year) or $25.00 (2 years)

Send check, m.o., or major credit card no. or ask for free details:

TravLtips

Dept. U7 Box 188 Flushing, NY 11358

Add $2 per year U.S. funds for Canada & Mexico.

For the convenience of those who wish to place a classified notice in *THE NATION:*

RATES: $.80 per word, 15 word minimum; telephone and POB numbers count as two words, abbreviations and zip codes as one. Classified Display: $35/column inch. Copy deadline 17 days prior to issue date. **Payment must accompany order.**

Take advantage of our special offer: place an order for three insertions of your ad, and we will print a fourth insertion free!

TO: *THE NATION*
Classified Department
72 Fifth Avenue, N.Y., NY 10011

Enclosed is my check for $____ for my advertisement to run ____ weeks

Advertiser _____

Address _____ City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Copy: _____

Payment in U.S. currency

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRAVEL

MEXICO

Nation readers welcome at Belfrage villa, offering spring weather, secluded garden with pool, gourmet food, company to your taste, plus privacy for relaxation or work. Friendly base to explore your Third World neighbor. Apdo. 630, Cuernavaca, Mor. 62000, Mexico. Phone 135234.

HA ZEN INN. Forest refuge, pure food. Box 741, Mt. View, HI 96771.

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 2018

P	I	C	K	W	I	C	K	P	A	P	E	R	S	■
E	■	A	■	I	■	U	■	O	■	I	■	A	■	S
E	R	M	I	N	E	S	■	L	A	P	I	L	L	I
P	■	B	■	D	■	P	■	I	■	E	■	L	■	N
S	T	R	I	F	E	■	S	T	A	R	T	I	N	G
I	■	I	■	A	■	G	■	I	■	■	■	E	■	■
G	■	C	A	L	O	R	I	C	■	P	A	S	T	A
H	■	■	■	L	■	A	■	I	■	A	■	■	■	L
T	I	R	E	S	■	S	H	A	M	P	O	O	■	B
■	■	O	■	■	■	S	■	N	■	E	■	F	■	A
D	I	S	A	V	O	W	S	■	B	R	I	T	O	N
O	■	S	■	A	■	I	■	S	■	C	■	H	■	B
T	R	I	P	P	E	D	■	H	E	L	L	E	N	E
S	■	N	■	I	■	O	■	A	■	I	■	E	■	R
■	W	I	N	D	O	W	S	H	O	P	P	I	N	G

MOVING?

ATTACH MAILING LABEL HERE

Don't miss a single issue of THE NATION.

New address:

Name _____

Street _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Please allow 6-8 weeks for processing.

Mail to: THE NATION
P.O. Box 1953
Marion, Ohio 43305

Crossword Puzzle No. 2019

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 March like this, perhaps on foot. (6)
5 Spend your years in reading, partly. (7)
10 How to make pets, perhaps, other than 1. (3,2,4)
11 See 4 down
12 The tree is about one quarter of it, to beg the answer rather than the question. (7)
13 There's purpose in what some people have to pay for clothing. (7)
14 and 20 down This sometimes takes perception—especially when dealing with marked cards. (12)
16 Red and green, primarily. (9)
18 They exist as Hydrophidae, though they suggest what the delirious might do. (3,6)
20 Deals in what sounds like providers of electricity! (5)
22 Medusa's sort of taken for it. (7)
24 Duck what one might try to do on a donkey? (7)
26 Right dress around it? You're bigger if you have. (5)
27 This is 29 too much! (9)
28 Enter at perhaps 12. (7)
29 Saw, perhaps, what the teller might be doing. (6)

DOWN

2 Perhaps music carved out of stone? (5)
3 Greasy get-up when fate alters the material substance. (7)
4 and 11 across It might be quite a spread, though some deem it crazy! (9,5)
5 Reading material father obviously gets through. (5)
6 One of these might be an 18 down. (7)
7 Name it incorrectly in everything referring to support. (9)
8 Perhaps large land holdings in the county seat set adrift. (7)
9 Be loud when in trouble with more than a little to drink? (6)
15 Bringing up painting has a point with games, and carry one away, perhaps! (9)
17 Even coastal steamers might, but they make travel easier! (9)
18 A couple of horses with a broken leg? That's what the stars do to the banner! (7)
19 The runner possibly belongs to me in a bad one. (7)
20 See 14 across
21 Drama in the ship spreads so! (6)
23 When it comes to a duffer, one might be almost irreplaceable! (5)
25 Like a Scotsman, but from a different country. (5)

SEE LAST WEEK'S SOLUTION AT LEFT

PUZZLERS' PARTY

Meet Frank W. Lewis at *The Nation* in September. For details send your name and address to Puzzlers' Party, The Nation, 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011.

X-523

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VOTE FOR SURVIVAL

A Nationwide Call to Action

"It is essential in this dangerous nuclear age that everyone participate in this democracy by voting. I urge all citizens to learn the facts, know the positions of the candidates for electoral office, and vote with your informed judgment. Your vote can help to prevent nuclear war."

Joanne Woodward
Chair, National Women's Conference to Prevent Nuclear War

The increasingly reckless nuclear arms race can bring only one end: the wail of sirens and the incineration of us all. From **September 12th, National Women's Day of Action to Prevent Nuclear War**, through **October 4th, National Voter Registration Day**, Americans everywhere will join in a climactic nationwide campaign to stop this perilous weapons buildup. We'll do this by working to elect leaders who will press for a nuclear freeze: an immediate halt **on both sides** to all testing and deployment of nuclear weapons.

HERE'S WHAT TO DO:

Now

- **Xerox this flyer, post it, and pass it on!** Joanne Woodward's call to vote for survival must reach every American!
- **Find out how to register to vote** in your area, and get hold of voter registration forms, if available. Call your city or county government for information.
- **Display a 3-color vote for survival bumper sticker and button.** To order one of each, send $1 plus a self-addressed stamped envelope to Women's Peace Initiatives, 2121 Decatur Place, Washington, D.C. 20008. For ten of each, send $5. Allow four weeks for delivery.

Sept. 12th thru Oct. 4th

- **Tell everyone you know or meet to register by October 4th and vote for survival on November 6th.** Discuss the threat of nuclear war with friends, family, neighbors, coworkers, classmates, your grocery store clerk. Urge everyone who shares your concern to register and vote. Another good way to register voters is to set up a stand with a "Vote for Survival" banner at a nearby shopping center, hospital waiting room, or bus stop. (Note: **half** of eligible Americans are nonvoters! You'll easily find ten. Young people and those who have recently moved are especially good prospects.)
- **Write down the names and phone numbers of all unregistered persons you encounter.** Call and remind them to register by October 4th.

Nov. 5th

- **Call the people you've persuaded to register** and remind them to vote on November 6th. Arrange help in getting to the polls for anyone who needs it.

Join with citizens around the nation—women, men, and children—in this national period of action. If one million of us register even two new pro-freeze voters each, we can decide the November election outcome. Do your part to save this planet!

ACORN • Americans for Democratic Action • Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy • Council for a Livable World
Environmental Action • Federation of Professional Women's Organizations • Freeze Voter '84 • Greenpeace USA
In the Public Interest • Jobs with Peace • NAACP • National Association of Colored Women's Clubs
National Campaign to Stop the MX • National Education Association • New Jewish Agenda • Peace Links
Professional's Coalition for Nuclear Arms Control • Project Vote • Riverside Church Disarmament Program • SANE
SERVE • The Children's Foundation • Union of American Hebrew Congregations • Unitarian Universalists Association (D.C. office)
Women's Equity Action League • WILPF • Women's Peace Initiatives • Women Strike for Peace • Women, USA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED